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Abstract
We study sequential sealed bid auctions with decreasing reserve prices when there are
two identical objects for sale and more than two unit-demand bidders. In the literature, an
equilibrium with a strictly increasing bidding function in the stage one auction is found only
when reserve prices are (weakly) increasing. Under decreasing reserve prices, bidders may
have an incentive not to bid in the first auction and an equilibrium with a strictly increasing
bidding function at stage one does not exist. However, we find that a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium always exists, and its shape depends on the distance between the two reserve
prices. Moreover, the equilibrium exhibits some pooling at the stage one auction, which
disappears in the limit as the number of bidders tends to infinity. We also show that revenue
equivalence between first and second price sequential auctions holds under decreasing reserve
prices. Finally, our results allow to shed some light on an optimal order problem (increasing
versus decreasing reserve prices, under exogenous reserve prices) for selling the two objects.
Keywords: Sequential Auctions; First Price Auction; Second Price Auction; Revenue
Equivalence
1 Introduction
We study a model of sequential sealed bid auctions with decreasing reserve prices. Sequen-
tial sealed bid auctions have received scarce attention: Milgrom and Weber (1999) and Weber
(1983) provide theoretical analyses of sequential auctions for multiple identical objects under
the assumption that there are no reserve prices. Gong et al. (2014) (GTX henceforth) study
sequential auctions for identical objects, allowing for different reserve prices at different stages.
When only two objects are for sale, they show that a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium with
a strictly increasing bidding function at stage one exists if and only if the reserve prices are
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(weakly) ascending and they provide an equivalence result between sequential first and second
price auctions. When reserve prices are descending, they identify an equilibrium only when the
first auction's reserve price is sufficiently larger than the second auction's reserve price (see the
equilibrium (a) below in the introduction) and suggest that mixed-strategy equilibria may exist
in other cases, but they do not identify them.
Our paper essentially complements their analysis. We study sequential (first price and second
price) auctions with two identical objects and more than two unit-demand bidders. We show
that: a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists for any pair of decreasing reserve prices;
in the limit, as the number of bidders grows to infinity, the equilibrium bidding function at
stage one converges to a strictly increasing function; sequential first price auctions are revenue
equivalent to sequential second price auctions even under decreasing reserve prices. Last, we use
our results to tackle a problem about the optimal order of sale for two objects.
In order to understand better our results, it is useful to recall a few properties of the equilib-
rium described by GTX for the case of ascending reserve prices. To fix the ideas, let us focus on
sequential second price auctions, for which the equilibrium bidding at stage two is straightfor-
ward. Let r1; r2 denote the reserve prices for the first and second auction, respectively. Then,
given r1  r2, a bidder with value x participates in the first auction if and only if x  r1, and
bids as in a single-unit auction if x  r2 because it is not profitable for him to participate in
the second auction. Conversely, a bidder with value x > r2 bids less aggressively than in a
single-unit auction because he will have another opportunity to win, at stage two, if he loses at
stage one.
With descending reserve prices, the incentive to shade bids at stage one is magnified because,
all else being equal, r2 < r1 makes the stage two auction more profitable for a bidder that can
participate both stages. In particular, a bidder may choose not to compete at stage one even
though his value is greater than r1, because winning the object at price r1 may be less profitable
than competing in the second auction.1 This force must be taken into account when constructing
an equilibrium, and we obtain that the shape of the equilibrium depends on the distance between
r1 and r2. Specifically, in the pure strategy symmetric equilibrium of the second price sequential
auction we have that:
(a) When r1 is sufficiently larger than r2, no bidder participates the first stage auction.
(b) When r1 takes on intermediate values, there is a threshold  > r1 such that bidders with
value smaller than  do not bid in the first auction, and bidders with value at least  bid
r1.
1A similar phenomenon occurs in McAfee and Vincent (1997), in which the seller of a single object auctions
the object multiple times, until it is sold, and at each stage he chooses a reserve price given his beliefs on the
bidders values, as determined by the information that the object has not been sold in the past. At each given
stage, a bidder with value larger than the current reserve price may choose not to bid, and wait for a successive
auction with a lower reserve price.
2
(c) If r1 is close to r2, then the equilibrium is characterized by two thresholds,  (whose value is
different from the previous case) and  > , such that bidders with value less than  do not
bid in the first auction, bidders with value between  and  bid r1, and bidders with value
bigger than  adopt a strictly increasing bidding function. This equilibrium arises because
when r1 becomes small, bidders with high value prefer to bid slightly more than r1 if all the
others active bidders are bidding r1.
Our result is consistent with GTX's finding that no symmetric equilibrium characterized by
a strictly increasing bidding function exists. Interestingly, for each r1 > r2 the equilibrium in
(c) emerges if the number of bidders is sufficiently large. In addition, in such a case  and  are
both close to r1. Therefore (almost) each bidder with value above r1 participates in the stage
one auction and bids according to a strictly increasing function. This is the consequence of the
fact that, given the large number of opponents, the expected payoff from participating in the
second auction is quite small for a bidder with value greater than r1, and thus it is suboptimal
not trying to win at stage one.
Our findings allow us to deal with a problem introduced in GTX about the optimal order
in which two objects should be auctioned. The setting considered has two sellers, each of whom
owns one of the two objects, and it is commonly known that one seller has value r > 0 for her
own object while the other seller has value zero for her own object. The objects are offered
through sequential auctions such that at each stage the reserve price is equal to the seller's value
for the object auctioned at that stage, and an auctioneer chooses the object which is put for
sale first in order to maximize the sum of the sellers' profits. GTX use the equilibrium in (a)
to show that decreasing reserve prices are optimal if r is large, whereas we use the equilibrium
in (c) to show that increasing reserve prices are optimal when r is small. Moreover we obtain
more specific results if the values are uniformly distributed.
Finally, we show that sequential first price and second price auctions are revenue equivalent
even under decreasing reserve prices. This result is useful since sequential first price auctions
are somewhat more complicated to deal with. Unlike in the sequential second price auctions,
where at stage two a weakly dominant bid exists for each bidder who lost at stage one, and it
depends only on the bidder's value, for sequential first price auctions the stage two equilibrium
bid for each bidder who lost at stage one depends on his beliefs about the values of the other
active bidders at stage two, which in turn depend on the information he learnt at stage one.
The pooling of types at stage one, due to the decreasing reserve prices, makes the computation
of those beliefs and the associated bids not straightforward even with just two objects for sale.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model in detail.
Section 3 provides the analysis for sequential second price auctions and for the optimal order
problem. Section 4 proves that sequential first price auctions and sequential second price auctions
are revenue equivalent. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
Two identical objects are offered to n  3 bidders through two sequential (sealed bid) auctions
with reserve prices r1 and r2, respectively. Specifically, one object is offered using an auction
with reserve price r1, and the winning bid is publicly announced. In case that the highest bid
is submitted by m  2 bidders, the winning bidder is selected randomly, with each highest
bidder having probability 1m to win. If no bid is submitted at stage one, then this information is
revealed to each bidder before stage two, and the object remains unsold. The remaining object
is offered using an auction with reserve price r2.
We assume that each bidder is risk neutral, has no time discount and has unit demand,
so that no bidder wants to buy more than one object, and, all else being equal, bidders are
indifferent between getting the object at either stage. Moreover unit demand implies that the
winner of the first object does not join the second auction. Last we assume that each bidder i
has value Xi for the object and each Xi is i.i.d. on the non-negative support [x; x], with c.d.f.
F , and density f  F 0 > 0 that is continuous in the support. We write xi to denote a realization
of Xi, which is privately observed by bidder i.
We are interested in analyzing sequential sealed bid first (F ) and second (S) price auctions
when the reserve prices are descending, that is when x  r2 < r1  x.2 To ease comparisons
with the literature, we will also report the case of ascending reserve prices, but notice that except
for Subsection 3.1 and Subsection 4.2, we assume r1 > r2.
A bidding strategy in auction A = F; S for bidder i consists of a pair of functions (b
(1)
A;i; b
(2)
A;i)
which specify bidder i's bids in stage one, b
(1)
A;i, as a function of i's value xi, and in stage two,
b
(2)
A;i (conditional on i not winning in stage one), as a function of xi and of any other information
that bidder i has obtained in stage one. Since bidders are symmetric ex ante, we restrict the
analysis to strategies that do not depend on bidders' identities. Therefore, a strategy will be
indicated as a pair (b
(1)
A ; b
(2)
A ).
We are interested in equilibria that are sequentially rational, in the sense that the strategies
in the second period form an equilibrium, given the information the bidders obtained in stage
one, for any possible outcome of the stage one auction.
Before we proceed with the analysis, we recall from, e.g., Krishna (2010) a feature of a single
stage first price auction with k  2 bidders and reserve price r2, in which each bidder's beliefs
about the highest value among the other k  1 bidders are given by a c.d.f. G (with density g).
In this game, the equilibrium bidding function  satisfies
(r2) = r2 and 
0(x) = (x  (x)) g(x)
G(x)
for x > r2 (1)
Under the specific assumption that values are i.i.d. random variables each with c.d.f. F and
2Notice that the stage two reserve price has no effect if r2 < x, just like r2 = x. The stage one reserve price
prevents each bidder from participating in the stage one auction if r1 > x, just like r1 = x.
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support [x; x], it follows that G(x) = F k 1(x) and g(x)G(x) =
(k 1)f(x)
F (x) . Therefore from (1) we
obtain the following equilibrium bidding function, which we use repeatedly in the paper:
k;r2(x) = x 
R x
r2
F k 1(s)ds
F k 1(x)
=
R x
x maxfr2; sgdF k 1(s)
F k 1(x)
for x  r2 (2)
In this equilibrium, the expected payoff of a bidder with type x  r2 is
vk(x) =
Z x
r2
F k 1(s)ds (3)
As it is well known, vk(x) is also the expected payoff of a bidder with type x in the unique un-
dominated equilibrium in a single stage second price auction with the same information structure
described above.3
We are now ready to proceed with the analysis of the equilibria of the sequential auctions.
We will start from second price auctions, as they are simpler.
3 Second price auctions
We start the analysis by working backwards. We thus look at the equilibrium bid in the second
stage auction, for all the active bidders. This is actually straightforward, since in a one-shot
second price auction each bidder with value at least r2 has a (weakly) dominant strategy, which
consists in bidding his own value, regardless of the information he obtained at stage one. Hence,
we introduce b
(2)
S = b
(2)
S , with
b
(2)
S (x) =
8<:no bid if x 2 [x; r2)x if x 2 [r2; x] (4)
Conversely, the equilibrium bidding function at stage one is not as straightforward, and it
depends on the relationship between r1 and r2.
In order to do our analysis, some additional notation is needed. Given a candidate equilib-
rium (b
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S ), for each x and y in [x; x] we use uS(x; y) to denote the payoff of a bidder with
value x if he bids b
(1)
S (y) in stage one (i.e., if he bids as a bidder with value y is supposed to do
according to b
(1)
S ), given that the other bidders follow (b
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S ). Moreover, we let: p(y) denote
the probability to win at stage one with the bid b
(1)
S (y); t(y) denote a bidder's expected payment
at stage one, conditional on winning at stage one with the bid b
(1)
S (y); and Gb(1)S (y)
denote the
expected c.d.f., conditional on losing with the bid b
(1)
S (y), for the highest value among the other
3We use vk(x) rather than vk;r2(x) in favour of lighter notation as there is no ambiguity: vk(x) is always
related to the second stage auction whose reserve price is r2.
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bidders who lost at stage one. Then, given x  r2, we have that
uS(x; y) = p(y)(x  t(y)) + (1  p(y))
Z x
r2
G
b
(1)
S (y)
(s)ds (5)
The first term indicates the expected payoff from winning the first auction times the prob-
ability of winning it, while the second term indicates the expected payoff from participat-
ing the second auction times the probability of participating it. In particular, note that the
payoff of a bidder with value x 2 [r2; x] in stage two, conditional on losing in stage one, isR x
x (x   maxfr2; sg)dGb(1)S (y)(s), or
R x
r2
G
b
(1)
S (y)
(s)ds after applying integration by parts. Notice
that when b
(1)
S is strictly increasing, it is straightforward to derive Gb(1)S (y)
. Things are more
complicated when b
(1)
S is constant over an interval, as we will see below.
3.1 Ascending reserve prices
The case with (weakly) ascending reserve prices is solved by GTX. The following is an adaptation
of their result to the two-object case, allowing for r1 > x. (GTX assume that [x; x] = [0; 1] and
r1 = 0.)
Proposition 1 (Proposition 2 in GTX). Suppose that two objects are offered through sequential
second price auctions with ascending reserve prices r1; r2 such that x  r1  r2  x. Then there
exists an equilibrium in which
b
(1)
S (x) =
8>>><>>>:
no bid if x 2 [x; r1)
x if x 2 [r1; r2)
n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; x]
(6)
and b
(2)
S (x) = b
(2)
S (x) from (4).
The rationale behind the equilibrium bidding function (6) is as follows. A bidder whose value
is between r1 and r2 only participates in the first auction; from his perspective he is joining a
one shot second price auction. As a result, it is still weakly dominant for him to bid his own
value. A bidder with value above r2 has two attempts at getting the object. At the second (and
last) one he will bid his own value. In the first stage, he bids the expected payment he would
make if he were to lose the first auction and win the second. This corresponds to the equilibrium
bid in a one shot first price auction with reserve price r2 and n   1 bidders.4 Krishna (2010)
illustrates this result for sequential auctions with no reserve prices, so that the only difference
in (6) comes from bidders with values below r2.
4We notice that this result would not hold if bidders were not risk neutral or if there was some time discounting.
Risk averse bidders will shade less their bids in the first stage to reduce the risk of losing the object when the
winning bid is still below their value. Impatient bidders will also bid more aggressively in the first stage because
to them, de facto, an object is more valuable today than tomorrow.
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3.2 Descending reserve prices
In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, with r1  r2, each bidder participates in the auction at stage
j if and only if his value is grater (or equal) than rj , for j = 1; 2. Conversely, when r1 > r2 we
clearly have that bidders with value smaller than r2 never bid, since they cannot make a positive
payoff in either stage. For this reason, we will consider only x  r2. However, when r1 > r2 not
all bidders with value greater than r1 bid at stage one, since it could be more profitable to try
to win the second auction, which has a lower reserve price. As we will see, it is especially true
when r1 is much larger than r2, but this principle holds in general. For instance, a bidder with
type x = r1 does not bid in the first auction because he cannot make a positive payoff in that
auction, but has a positive payoff from participating in the stage two auction given that r2 < r1.
This suggests that the equilibrium analysis is more complicated with descending reserve
prices. In fact, no equilibrium with a strictly increasing bidding function at stage one exists
(about this, we provide an explanation in next subsection). We show that, nevertheless, a
pure strategy equilibrium exists, and its features depend on the (relative) magnitude of r1.
In particular, when r1 is large, we have an equilibrium in which nobody participates the first
auction. The value of r1 is so big that no type prefers to pay r1 for the object when he can
compete against all the other bidders for the remaining one in the second stage auction.
When r1 takes on intermediate values, we find an equilibrium in which bidders with high
values bid r1 in the first auction, and the others do not bid. For intermediate values of r1 bidders
with high values are induced to participate the stage one auction but none of them wants to bid
more than r1.
Finally, when r1 takes on small values, we have an equilibrium with two cutoffs: bidders
with small values do not join the first auction, those with intermediate values bid r1, and the
remaining bidders bid according to n 1;r2 . As r1 becomes small, a type close to x prefers to
bid marginally above r1 (if all the active bidders are expected to bid r1). This breaks down the
equilibrium computed for intermediate values of r1 and the equilibrium is restored by introducing
the second cutoff.
In order to formally state our results at the end of this section, it will be convenient to
analyze these cases separately.
3.2.1 Large r1
When r1 is sufficiently large, GTX find an equilibrium in which no bidder bids at stage one.
Precisely, we define r1  x  vn(x) and consider
b
(1)
S (x) = no bid for each x 2 [x; x]
If r1  r1, there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder follows b(1)S , essentially because
bidding at stage one is unprofitable with respect to competing at stage two, when the reserve
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price is considerably lower. More in detail, given that all other bidders do not bid in stage
one, (i) each type x  r2 obtains the payoff vn(x) by not bidding at stage one; (ii) for each
type x  r2, the payoff from bidding r1 in stage one is x  r1; (iii) the first alternative is more
profitable than the second since the inequality vn(x)  x   r1 holds for each x 2 [r2; x], given
r1  r1.5
3.2.2 Intermediate r1
When r2 < r1 < r1, it may be natural to inquire the existence of an equilibrium (b
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S )
with a cutoff  such that all bidders with value below  do not participate at stage one, and the
others follow a strictly increasing bidding function. In other words we are interested in whether
there exists a  2 (x; x) such that (i) b(1)S (x) = no bid for x 2 [x; ) (i.e., types with value in
[x; ) do not bid in stage one); (ii) b
(1)
S ()  r1; (iii) b(1)S is strictly increasing in [; x] (i.e., types
with value in [; x] bid according to a strictly increasing function, and  is the smallest type to
participate the first stage auction).
However, such an equilibrium fails to exist. Arguing as for ascending reserve prices, if b
(1)
S
were strictly increasing for x > , then b
(1)
S (x) should be type x's expected payment in the stage
two auction, conditional on winning at stage two, that is n 1;r2(x). Therefore we should have
n 1;r2()  r1, from which we conclude that  > r1. Moreover, type  must be indifferent
between bidding b
(1)
S () and not bidding. This indierence is equivalent to    r1 = vn()Fn 1() . In
fact, given the proposed equilibrium strategy, type  wins an object if and only if he has the
highest or the second highest value. If he has the highest value, his expected payo is    r1
if he bids b
(1)
S () at stage one, is
R 
r2

F (s)
F ()
n 1
ds = vn()
Fn 1() if he does not bid at stage one. If
type  has the second highest value, his expected payo is the same regardless of whether he
bids b
(1)
S () or does not bid at stage one, as in both cases the highest value bidder wins the
stage one auction and type 's beliefs about his opponents' values are the same. Rearranging
the indierence condition one gets r1 = n;r2(). As  > r2 we obtain r1 = n;r2() > n 1;r2()
which contradicts n 1;r2()  r1 mentioned above.6
To overcome this problem, GTX suggest to look for a mixed strategy equilibrium but they
do not compute it. Conversely, we find an equilibrium such that the bidding function at stage
one is at in a suitable interval. Specifically, we look at b
(1)
S such that b
(1)
S (x) = r1 for all x in
an interval [; ] for some  >  to be properly defined. Indeed, for r1 slightly smaller than
r1 we identify an equilibrium in which each type in [; x] bids r1 (here  = x), that is b
(1)
S is
horizontal in the whole interval [; x], and type  is indifferent between not bidding and bidding
5Notice that r1 can be viewed as the expected payment for type x from participating in the second period
auction, given that he will face n   1 opponents. In case that r1  r1, type x prefers to wait for the stage two
auction. If r1 < r1, then type x prefers to purchase the object at the stage one auction by paying r1.
6When r1 = r2 the contradiction does not arise as we can set  = r1. See (6).
8
r1 at stage one:
b^
(1)
S (x) =
8<:no bid if x 2 [x; )r1 if x 2 [; x] (7)
The formal statement of our result is reported in Proposition 2 (ii). In this equilibrium there is
substantial pooling in stage one, as each two types in [; x] have the same probability to win in
stage one. This plays a key role in complicating the updated beliefs at stage two of each stage
one losing bidder.
For each x and y in [x; x] we use u^S(x; y) to denote the payoff of bidder with value x if he
bids b^
(1)
S (y) in stage one (i.e., if he bids as a bidder with value y is supposed to do according
to b^
(1)
S ), given that each other bidder follows the strategy (b^
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S ). Hence, u^S(x; x) is the
payoff of a bidder with value x from not bidding at stage one; u^S(x; ), or u^S(x; x), is his payoff
from bidding r1 at stage one. We now describe how u^S(x; x), u^S(x; ) are derived, and how  is
determined. In order to shorten notation, we write   = F ().
Remark that in the following the word beliefs indicates the updated beliefs at stage two of a
losing bidder about the highest value among the other bidders who lost at stage one, and these
beliefs will be represented by a c.d.f. G which depends on the stage one winning bid and the
bidder's stage one bid.
Regarding u^S(x; x), if a bidder has not bid at stage one and learns that there has been no bid
by any bidder, an event with probability  n 1 from his ex ante point of view, then b^(1)S implies
that his beliefs are given by the c.d.f. G^(jno;no) such that
G^(sjno; no) =
8<:
Fn 1(s)
 n 1 if s 2 [x; ]
1 if s 2 (; x]
(8)
On the other hand, if a bidder has not bid at stage one and learns that the winning bid has
been r1, an event with probability 1   n 1 from his point of view, his beliefs are given by the
c.d.f. G^(jno; r1) such that (the details of the derivation of (9) and (11) below are in the proof
of Proposition 2 in the Appendix.)
G^(sjno; r1) =
8<:
(n 1)(1  )
1  n 1 F
n 2(s) if s 2 [x; ]
1  
1  n 1
Fn 1(s)  n 1
F (s)   if s 2 (; x]
(9)
At the time of choosing to make no bid, the bidder's expected c.d.f. for the highest value among
the other losing bidders is G^no, such that G^no(s) =  
n 1G^(sjno;no) + (1    n 1)G^(sjno; r1).
Therefore, in view of (5), the payoff from not bidding at stage one of type x  r2 is
u^S(x; x) =
Z x
r2
G^no(s)ds (10)
Regarding u^S(x; ), let p^() denote the probability to win at stage one for a bidder bidding
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r1, which we derive explicitly in (62) in the Appendix. In case the bidder loses, his beliefs are
given by
G^(sjr1; r1) =
8<:
(n 1)(1  )
2(1 p^()) F
n 2(s) if s 2 [x; ]
1  
n
(n 1)Fn(s) n Fn 1(s)+ n
(1 p^())(F (s)  )2 if s 2 (; x]
(11)
Hence, the payoff of a type x  r2 from bidding r1 is
u^S(x; ) = p^()(x  r1) + (1  p^())
Z x
r2
G^(sjr1; r1)ds (12)
Now that u^S(x; x) and u^S(x; ) are defined, we identify  in b^
(1)
S as the unique solution to the
equation
u^S(; x) = u^S(; ) (13)
In order to prove that (b^
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S ) is an equilibrium, in the Appendix (see Section A) we show
that: (i) there exists a unique solution to (13) in the interval (r2; x); (ii) u^S(x; x) > u^S(x; )
for each x 2 [x; ), and u^S(x; x) < u^S(x; ) for each x 2 (; x]. Moreover, we also need to take
into account that a bidder wins for sure at stage one if he bids more than r1. This deviation
is unprofitable if and only if the inequality u^S(x; x)  x   r1 holds for each x 2 [x; ), and
u^S(x; )  x  r1 holds for each x 2 [; x]. It turns out that both inequalities are satisfied when
r1 is not too small, that is if r1 belongs to the interval (~r1; r1), for a suitable ~r1 between r2 and
r1. Conversely, u^S(x; ) < x  r1 holds if r1 is smaller than ~r1: for a small r1, a type x prefers
to bid more than r1 in order to secure a win at stage one. This suggests that if r1 is small, then
the equilibrium b
(1)
S is strictly increasing for x close to x. The next subsection is about this case.
3.2.3 Small r1
Given r1 between r2 and ~r1, we find an equilibrium with the following bidding function at stage
one, in which the types  and , with r1 <  <  < x, are identified by suitable indifference
conditions described by (15) and (16) below:
~b
(1)
S (x) =
8>>><>>>:
no bid if x 2 [x; )
r1 if x 2 [; ]
n 1;r2(x) if x 2 (; x]
(14)
Hence, ~b
(1)
S prescribes that: (i) bidders with value in [x; ) do not bid in stage one, but only bid
in stage two (provided that x  r2); (ii) bidders with value in [; ] bid r1 in stage one, that is
~b
(1)
S is constant in the interval [; ]; (iii) bidders with value in (; x] bid their expected payment
in the second auction conditional on losing at stage one and winning at stage two, as in (6).
In order to determine  and , for each x and y in [x; x] we use ~uS(x; y) to denote the payoff
of a bidder with value x if he bids ~b
(1)
S (y) in stage one, given that all the other bidders follow
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the strategy (~b
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S ). For instance, ~uS(x; x) is the payoff of type x from not bidding in stage
one; ~uS(x; ), or ~uS(x; ), is his payoff from bidding r1 in stage one. We evaluate ~uS(x; y) in a
way similar to that described in the previous subsection for u^S(x; y), using the beliefs of each
losing bidder at stage two, given the information he obtains at stage one. Matters are slightly
more complicated here because the equilibrium bids at stage one are not only no bid and r1,
but any bid in the range of ~b
(1)
S .
The values of  and  in ~b
(1)
S are obtained as the unique solution of the following two
equations:
~uS(; x) = ~uS(; ) (15)
~uS(; ) = lim
y#
~uS(; y) (16)
Equation (15) states that type  is indifferent between not bidding, and bidding r1. Equa-
tion (16) states that type  is indifferent between bidding r1, and bidding just above n 1;r2()
which is greater than r1. As a result we have that ~b
(1)
S is discontinuous at .
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We can therefore summarize our results as follows.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the two objects are offered through sequential second price auctions
with descending reserve prices, that is x  r2 < r1  x. Let r1  x   vn(x). There exists a
unique ~r1 2 (r2; r1) such that
(i) if r1 2 (r2; ~r1), then there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder follows the strategy
~b
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S and ;  satisfy (15)-(16);
(ii) if r1 2 [~r1; r1), then there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder follows the strategy
b^
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S and  satisfies (13);
(iii) if r1 2 [r1; x], then there exists an equilibrium in which no bidder bids at stage one, and
each bidder bids according to b
(2)
S at stage two.
3.3 Large number of bidders
It is interesting to study the above equilibrium as the number of bidders increases. Remark first
that limn!+1 r1 = x. The following proposition shows that the same limit result holds for ~r1.
In addition, it shows that the set of types that pool their bid becomes arbitrarily small.
Proposition 3. As n! +1, we have that ~r1 tends to x, and both  and  which solve (15)-(16)
tend to r1.
The implications of Proposition 3 are straightforward: for a large n, the equilibrium described
by Proposition 2(i) arises unless r1 is very close to x. Moreover, almost each type of bidder with
7Notice that b^
(1)
S is a special case of
~b
(1)
S , obtained when  = x, and in such a case we find that (15) is equivalent
to (13). The values of  in cases (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2 are otherwise different.
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n 3 5 10 15 20 30 50 75
c 1.57735 1.257289 1.111677 1.071574 1.052689 1.034499 1.020411 1.013514
c 2.1547 1.365022 1.131076 1.079438 1.056924 1.036304 1.021040 1.013790
~r1 0.464102 0.732589 0.884114 0.926408 0.946142 0.964968 0.979393 0.986398
r1 0.6 0.80 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99
Table 1: Numerical solutions of the cutoffs values when bidders' values are uniformly distributed
in the unit interval, r2 = 0 and r1 > 0.
value above r1 bids in the stage one auction. The logic for this result is simple: given r1 > r2,
some types of bidder do not bid in stage one because they prefer to compete under the more
favourable terms of stage two, but if n is large then the intensity of the competition in both
stages is mainly determined by the number of bidders, rather than by reserve prices, and then
for a bidder it is unprofitable not to bid at stage one, unless his value is very close to r1.
3.4 Example with uniformly distributed values
Let us provide a parametric example and compare the equilibrium bids under increasing and
decreasing reserve prices. Suppose that values are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and r2 = 0.
For small r1, using Step 2 in the proof of Proposition 2 (and (50)-(52) in particular) we find
that (15)-(16) reduce to
1
n
 
n   n
   (   r1) 
1
2
n 1+
n  2
2n
n = 0 (17)
 n  2
2
n 1   (n  1)
n   nn 1 + n
(  )2 (  r1) + 
n 1   n 1
   = 0 (18)
For n = 3 the system of equations (17)-(18) can be solved analytically and we obtain the solutions
 = (1+
p
3
3 )r and  = (1+
2
p
3
3 )r. For larger n, analytical solutions are difficult or impossible to
obtain. However, inspection of (17)-(18) reveals that, for r1 2 (r2; ~r1), the solution to (15)-(16)
is homogeneous of degree one in r1, that is  = cr1 and  = cr1 for suitable coefficients c ,
and c with c > c > 1. Therefore  < 1 if and only if r1 <
1
c
. We can conclude that ~r1 =
1
c
.
Finally, we have that r1 =
n 1
n .
Table 1 reports the values of c and c obtained numerically for several values of n and
the corresponding values of ~r1 and r1. This allows us to visualize the convergence results in
Proposition 3.
For intermediate values of r1, Proposition 2(ii) applies and  is obtained by solving (17) when
 = 1. Figure 1 reports the equilibrium bidding functions for the first stage under ascending
(r1 = 0 and r2 = r) and descending (r1 = r and r2 = 0) reserve prices with five bidders, and
r 2 f0:5; 0:75g. The equilibrium bidding function for the ascending reserve price auction is
given by b
(1)
S in (6) and is plotted in grey. When r1 = 0:5, the equilibrium bidding function for
the descending reserve price auction given by ~b
(1)
S in (14) and is plotted in black in Figure 1(a)
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(a) Equilibrium bidding functions when r1 = 0 and r2 = 0:5 (grey)
or when r1 = 0:5 and r2 = 0 (black)
(b) Equilibrium bidding functions when r1 = 0 and r2 = 0:75
(grey) or when r1 = 0:75 and r2 = 0 (black)
Figure 1: Equilibrium bidding function in the first stage of a sequential second price auction
when r 2 f0:5; 0:75g. There are five bidders with values independently drawn from a uniform
distribution in the unit interval
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with  = 1:2572892 and  =
1:365022
2 . When r1 = 0:75, the equilibrium bidding function for the
descending reserve price auction is given by b^
(1)
S in (7) with  = 0:942 and is plotted in black in
Figure 1(b).
3.5 The optimal order problem
In this section we use Proposition 2 to relook at the optimal order problem for exogenously
given reserve prices analyzed by GTX. Specifically, we assume that values are randomly drawn
from the unit interval, and there are two different sellers, each of whom owns one of the two
objects that are auctioned. One seller has value zero for her own object, and the other seller has
a commonly known value r 2 (0; 1) for her own object. GTX assume that the objects are offered
through sequential second price auctions8 such that at each stage the reserve price coincides with
the seller's value for the object auctioned at that stage. An auctioneer then chooses the object
to put on sale first in order to maximize the sum of each seller's expected profits,  = 0 + r,
where 0 is just the expected revenue from the sale of the object that has no reserve price, while
r is the difference between the expected revenue from the object with reserve price r, and the
reserve price times the probability of making the sale.
Hence the auctioneer chooses between r1 = 0, r2 = r (that is, the object with zero reserve
price is auctioned first: reserve prices are increasing), and r1 = r, r2 = 0 (that is, the object
with zero reserve price is auctioned second: reserve prices are decreasing). We use irp, drp to
denote in a succinct way the case of increasing reserve prices and the case of decreasing reserve
prices, respectively. Therefore irp = 
0
irp+ 
r
irp will indicate the sellers' total profits given irp.
Likewise, drp = 
0
drp + 
r
drp will indicate the sellers' total profits given drp.
With respect to this optimal order problem, GTX only study the case of r > r1 because they
do not identify equilibria for the drp when r  r1. Proposition 4(i) below slightly generalizes
their results. In addition, we exploit Propositions 1 and 2 to obtain some results about the
optimal order when r < r1.
Proposition 4. Suppose x = 0, x = 1 and for only one unit we have a positive reserve price
r 2 (0; 1). The following holds:
(i) If r is close to 1, then irp < drp. Moreover, if irp  drp holds when r = r1, then
irp < drp holds for each r 2 (r1; 1).
(ii) If r is close to 0, then irp > irp.
(iii) Suppose, in addition, that values are uniformly distributed. If n = 3, then irp > drp
for r < 0:641, and irp < drp for r > 0:641. If n  4, then irp > drp for r 
minf5n 125n 5 ; ~r1g, and irp < drp for r  r1.
8Or sequential first price auctions: see the next section.
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Proposition 4 allows us to conclude that irp < drp when r is close to 1, whereas irp > drp
when r is close to 0. Under the assumption of uniform distribution of values, we can obtain more
specific results. In particular, as n tends to infinity, we have that minf5n 125n 5 ; ~r1g approaches 1.
We then conclude that, for large n, irp provide bigger profits at all r but those very close to 1.
The proof of Proposition 4 is made via standard mechanism design techniques (see, e.g.
Krishna, 2010; Myerson, 1981) that allow to write the sum of the sellers' revenues as the ex-
pectation of the virtual values (x) = x   1 F (x)f(x) of the winning bidders. For this reason it is
convenient to introduce order statistics: given the n random variables X1; ::; Xn which represent
the bidders' values, with Yh we denote the h-th highest order statistic, for h = 1; :::; n; yh is a
generic realized value for Yh.
In particular, we obtain first that
rirp > 
r
drp for each r 2 (0; 1) (19)
that is, for each r, the profit from the object with reserve price r is higher under irp. This
result is immediate when r  ~r1, since then rdrp = 0 (the only positive bid is r when r 2 [~r1; r1)
while nobody bids when r  r1) and rirp = E[maxfY3   r; 0g] > 0. Some more care is needed
to show that inequality (19) holds true also for r < ~r1, and the analysis can be found in the
Appendix. In general, inequality (19) holds because drp discourage bidders' participation at
stage one more than irp do at stage two. Under drp, a bidder knows that if he loses at stage
one he will compete at stage two in a more favorable auction with r2 = 0 < r1 = r; under irp, at
stage two each bidder has his last opportunity to win an object. This generates higher bidding
from a larger set of bidders under irp.
On the other hand, we find that the comparison between 0irp and 
0
drp depends on the
value of r: when r is close to 1, 0drp > 
0
irp by a magnitude that outweighs (19), and therefore
drp > irp if r is close to 1 (Proposition 4(i)). When, instead, r is close to 0, 
0
irp > 
0
drp. This
reinforces the effect from (19) and we conclude in Proposition 4(ii) that irp > drp if r is close
to 0.
In order to see why the comparison between 0irp and 
0
drp depends on r, notice that if r1 is
close to 1, 0drp = E(Y2) because with drp each bidder (does not bid at stage one and) bids his
own value at stage two. With irp, 0irp would be equal to E(Y2) if each bidder was bidding his
own value at stage one (this occurs if r = 1), but Proposition 1 reveals that each bidder with
value greater than r2 = r bids less than his true value. Therefore when r is close to 1 we have
that 0irp < 
0
drp. We then prove that overall irp < drp by writing the expected revenues as
expectation of the winners' virtual values, which yields
irp   drp = E[((Y2)  r)1fY2rg]
where 1fY2rg is a function that assumes value 1 if Y2  r and 0 otherwise. Following GTX's
argument, we nd that E[((Y2)  r)1fY2rg] is negative when r is close to 1. Hence irp < drp
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because irp generate a lower profit from the object with zero reserve price, and this effect
dominates over the effect described by (19).
On the other hand, observe that 0irp = 
0
drp if r = 0, and a small r > 0 increases 
0
irp of
a larger magnitude than it increases 0drp. Specifically, we notice that Proposition 2(i) applies
when r is close to 0 (and, in particular,  is small too), and distinguish between y2 >  (where
we find that irp prevail by a magnitude of order rn 1) and y2   (where we find that drp
might prevail, but by a magnitude of order rn). In the first case the profit from the object with
zero reserve price is n 1;r(y2) under irp, and y3 under drp. One can verify that
n 1;r(y2) > n 1;0(y2) = E(Y3jY2 = y2) (20)
Moreover, the expected profit difference is of order rn 1 since
n 1;r(y2)  n 1;0(y2) =
R r
0 F
n 2(s)ds
Fn 2(y2)
(see (2)) and
E
R r
0 F
n 2(s)ds
Fn 2(Y2)
1fY2>g

=
n(n  1)(1  F ())2
2
Z r
0
Fn 2(s)ds
which is about equal to nf
n 2(0)
2 r
n 1 for r close to 0.
Conversely, when y2   in some cases the profit with irp is smaller than with drp because
under drp the stage one winner could be the bidder with the third (or fourth ...) highest value,
and then the stage two revenue would be y2, which is greater than n 1;r(y2). However, in
expectation this profit difference is negligible with respect to nf
n 2(0)
2 r
n 1 as (i) there exists a
number  > 1 such that  < r if r is close to 0, therefore PrfY2  g = F ()n+ nF ()n 1(1 
F ()) is of order rn 1; (ii) for each profile of values such that y2 < , the profit given drp minus
the profit given irp is smaller than    r, which is of order r. From (i) and (ii) it follows that
the expected profit difference in favor of drp from the case y2   is of order rn and thus, given
r close to 0, the sign of 0irp   0drp is determined by nf
n 2(0)
2 r
n 1, which is positive.
4 First price auctions
In this section we prove that if the objects are offered through two sequential first price auctions,
with reserve prices r1; r2 such that r1 > r2, then an equivalence result holds in the following sense:
there exists an equilibrium for sequential first price auctions which generates the same outcome
(in terms of allocation of the objects and of bidders' expected payments) as the equilibrium
described by Proposition 2 for sequential second price auctions.9 Therefore, in particular, the
results in Subsections 3.3-3.5 apply also to sequential first price auctions.
9In fact, the equivalence result holds also if r1  r2, as established by GTX.
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As for the sequential second price auctions we focus on symmetric strategy profiles that are
sequentially rational and we use (b
(1)
F ; b
(2)
F ) to denote each bidder's bidding functions at stage
one and two. We remark that b
(1)
F is a function only of the bidder's value x, whereas b
(2)
F needs to
specify the bid of a stage one losing bidder as a function of his value x, his stage one bid b, and
the stage one winning bid bw. We use the notation b
(2)
F (xjb; bw), and for example b(2)F (xjno; r1)
is the bid of type x at stage two given that he has not bid at stage one (b = no), and given
that the winning bid at stage one has been r1 (bw = r1). With bw =no we represent the case in
which no bid has been submitted at stage one.
Unlike in the second price auctions, there is no dominant strategy for the stage two auction.
A bidder's equilibrium behavior at stage two must take into account his beliefs about the values
of the other losing bidders at stage one, and these beliefs depend on b and bw. Therefore, the
analysis of sequential first price auctions requires extra care, but this is mainly true for the
case of decreasing reserve prices, because when r1  r2 there exists an equilibrium in which the
stage one bidding function is strictly increasing (for x  r1), and this generates beliefs which
are relatively simple to manage (see GTX, or Subsection 4.2).
4.1 Descending reserve prices
Given r1 > r2, we consider ~r1; r1 defined in Proposition 2, and for each of the three cases
considered in Proposition 2 we identify an equilibrium for sequential first price auctions which
is equivalent to the equilibrium described by Proposition 2 for sequential second price auctions.
4.1.1 Intermediate r1
We start with r1 in the interval [~r1; r1), for which Proposition 2(ii) identifies (b^
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S ) where b^
(1)
S
is from (7) and b
(2)
S is from (4). For sequential first price auctions, we find an equilibrium given
by the functions (b^
(1)
F ; b^
(2)
F ) below, in which  is the unique solution to (13) as in Proposition 2(ii):
b^
(1)
F (x) =
8<:no bid if x 2 [x; )r1 if x 2 [; x] (21)
b^
(2)
F (xjno; no) =
8>>><>>>:
no bid if x 2 [x; r2)
n;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; )
n;r2() if x 2 [; x]
(22)
b^
(2)
F (xjno; r1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
no bid if x 2 [x; r2)
n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; )
b^
(2)
F (y^(x)jr1; r1) such that y^(x) is in
argmaxy2[;x](x  b^(2)F (yjr1; r1))G^(yjno; r1) if x 2 [; x]
(23)
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b^
(2)
F (xjr1; r1) =
8>>><>>>:
no bid if x 2 [x; r2)
n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; )
n 1;r2 ()G^(jr1;r1)+
R x
 sg^(sjr1;r1)ds
G^(xjr1;r1) if x 2 [; x]
(24)
b^
(2)
F (xjb; bw) =
8<:no bid if x 2 [x; r2)n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; x] for each bw > r1, bw  b (25)
The bidding functions in (22)-(25) refer to stage two and cover all the possible stage one
outcomes.10 In order to make sense of them, first notice that b^
(1)
F coincides with b^
(1)
S , hence the
beliefs at stage two of each losing bidder are the same as in sequential second price auctions,
and they are given by (8), (9), and (11).
Consider b^
(2)
F (jno;no) in (22). Each bidder's beliefs are given by G^(jno;no) in (8), and
g^(sjno;no)
G^(sjno;no) = (n   1)f(s)=F (s) for s 2 (r2; ), therefore (1) reveals that the equilibrium bidding
function for x 2 [r2; ) is n;r2(x), as specified by b^(2)F (jno;no). Moreover, b^(2)F (jno;no) needs to
specify a bid also for each type x 2 [; x], given bw = no.11 In this case such a bidder expects
all the others to have a value in [x; ). It is optimal for him to bid n;r2() i.e. the minimum
bid that guarantees a sure win at stage two, which is what (22) prescribes for x 2 [x; ).
The case in which the winning bid at stage one is r1 is more involved, since a losing bidder's
beliefs and bidding at stage two depend on the bidder's bid at stage one, which could be no,
or r1. In particular, a type who has not won at stage one expects an opponent of type x to
bid b^
(2)
F (xjno; r1) if x 2 [r2; ), and to bid b^(2)F (xjr1; r1) if x 2 [; x]. In order to see how these
functions are determined, assume that the function
b^
(2)
F;r1
(x) =
8<:b^
(2)
F (xjno; r1) if x 2 [r2; )
b^
(2)
F (xjr1; r1) if x 2 [; x]
(26)
is strictly increasing and notice that the beliefs of a losing bidder are: G^(jno; r1) in (9) if the
bidder has not bid at stage one (according to b^
(1)
F , these are the types in [r2; ), neglecting the
types in [x; r2)); and G^(jr1; r1) in (11) if the bidder has bid r1 at stage one (according to b^(1)F ,
these are the types in [; x]).
Then solving
b(r2) = r2 and b
0(x) = (x  b(x)) g^(xjno; r1)
G^(xjno; r1)
for x 2 (r2; )
10Of course, in all these bidding functions no type x 2 [x; r2) bids at stage two.
11This occurs if the bidder did not follow b^
(1)
F at stage one, perhaps because he made a mistake or because he
chose to deviate from b^
(1)
F .
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yields b^
(2)
F (xjno; r1) = n 1;r2(x) for x 2 [r2; ), which is what (23) prescribes. Likewise, solving
b() = n 1;r2() and b
0(x) = (x  b(x)) g^(xjr1; r1)
G^(xjr1; r1)
for (; x]
yields b^
(2)
F (xjr1; r1) =
n 1;r2 ()G^(jr1;r1)+
R x
 sg^(sjr1;r1)ds
G^(xjr1;r1) for x 2 [; x], which is what (24) pre-
scribes. Hence the resulting function b^
(2)
F;r1
in (26) is indeed strictly increasing.
We complete the description of b^
(2)
F (xjno; r1) and b^(2)F (xjr1; r1) by looking at off-the-equilibrium
play. Namely, b^
(2)
F (xjno; r1) for x 2 [; x] is obtained by computing the payoff maximizing bid
for a type x 2 [; x] who has not bid at stage one, given the beliefs G^(jno; r1) and given that
the opponents bid according to (26). In this case, we find that for such a type it is sub-optimal
to bid less than b^
(2)
F (jr1; r1). Likewise, b^(2)F (xjr1; r1) is the payoff maximizing bid for a type
x 2 [r2; ) who has bid r1 in stage one. We find that b^(2)F (xjr1; r1) = b^(2)F (xjno; r1) (equal to
n 1;r2(x)) in the interval [r2; ) because the equality
g^(sjno;r1)
G^(sjno;r1) =
g^(sjr1;r1)
G^(sjr1;r1) (equal to
(n 2)f(s)
F (s) )
holds for s 2 [r2; ).
Finally, the equilibrium strategies include also (25), which covers the off-the-equilibrium case
in which bw > r1. Then we suppose that the beliefs of each losing bidder are equal to the initial
beliefs, and therefore the stage two auction is an ordinary first price auction with n  1 bidders
and reserve price r2, for which (25) is the equilibrium bidding function.
Given (22)-(24), we can move to stage one and evaluate the total expected payoff (over the
two stages) for each type from not bidding at stage one, and from bidding r1. This allows to
prove that bidding according to (21) is a best reply for a bidder which expects all other bidders
to follow (21). For instance, for a type x 2 [r2; ), the payoff from not bidding at stage one is
u^F (x; x) =  
n 1

x  b^(2)F (xjno;no)

G^(xjno;no) + (1   n 1)

x  b^(2)F (xjno; r1)

G^(xjno; r1)
which is equal to u^S(x; x) = vn(x)+(n 1)(1  )vn 1(x) as it is obtained from (10). Moreover,
the payoff from bidding r1 is
u^F (x; ) = p^()(x  r1) + (1  p^())(x  b^(2)F (xjr1; r1))G^(xjr1; r1)
in which p^() is the probability to win at stage one after bidding r1 given by (62). Using (12) we
see that u^F (x; ) = u^S(x; ) = p^()(x r1)+ n 12 (1  )vn 1(x). We know from Proposition 2(ii)
that u^S(x; x)  maxfu^S(x; ); x   r1g for each x 2 [r2; ), hence not bidding at stage one is a
best reply for each type in [r2; ).
Finally, remark that the equilibrium (21)-(25) generates the same allocation of the two
objects as the equilibrium described by Proposition 2(ii) for sequential second price auctions,
and since in both cases each bidder with type x has payoff equal to zero, the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem implies that each type of bidder and the seller have the same payoff in both cases.
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4.1.2 Small r1, that is r1 2 (r2; ~r1), and large r1, that is r1 2 [r1; x]
When r1 2 (r2; ~r1) we find an equilibrium which is equivalent to the equilibrium of Proposi-
tion 2(i) for sequential second price auctions. The analysis is similar to that for the case of
r1 2 [~r1; r1), although somewhat more complicated as the equilibrium bidding function at stage
one is strictly increasing for x close to x. Therefore we have reported this part in the Appendix,
in the proof of Proposition 5(i).
When r1 2 [r1; x], we find the following equilibrium which is equivalent to the equilibrium
of Proposition 2(iii) for sequential second price auctions:
b
(1)
F (x) = no bid for each x 2 [x; x] (27)
b
(2)
F (xjno; no) =
8<:no bid if x 2 [x; r2)n;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; x] (28)
b
(2)
F (xjb; bw) = b^(2)F (xjb; bw) for each bw > r1, bw  b (29)
Given (27), when bw = no the beliefs of each bidder at stage two coincide with the initial
beliefs, and therefore an ordinary first price auction with n bidders and reserve price r2 is held,
for which (28) is the equilibrium bidding function. In case that some bids have been submitted
at stage one (an off-the-equilibrium event), we can argue as for b^
(2)
F in (25).
Moving at stage one, we see that for each bidder it is a best reply not to bid if he expects
the other bidders to follow (27)-(28): If a type x bids at stage one, his payoff is not larger than
x   r1, which is smaller than the payoff vn(x) he obtains from not bidding at stage one, since
r1  r1.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the two objects are offered through sequential first price auctions,
with descending reserve prices, that is x  r2 < r1  x. Let ~r1; r1 be defined as in Proposition 2.
Then
(i) if r1 2 (r2; ~r1), then there exists an equilibrium which generates the same outcome as the
equilibrium described by Proposition 2(i) for sequential second price auctions;
(ii) if r1 2 [~r1; r1), then there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder follows the strategy
b^
(1)
F ; b^
(2)
F in (21)-(25);
(iii) if r1 2 [r1; x], then there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder follows the strategy
b
(1)
F ;
b
(2)
F in (27)-(29).
4.2 Ascending reserve prices
The ascending reserve prices case is solved by GTX. The following is an adaptation of their
result to the two-object case, in which k;r1 is the equilibrium bidding function (for x  r1) in
20
a one-shot first price auction with k bidders, reserve price r1, and i.i.d. values, each with the
c.d.f. F .
Proposition 6 (Proposition 1 in GTX). Suppose that the two objects are offered through se-
quential first price auctions with ascending reserve prices r1, r2 such that x  r1  r2  x.
Then there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder plays the following strategy:
b
(1)
F (x) =
8>>><>>>:
no bid if x 2 [x; r1)
n;r1(x) if x 2 [r1; r2]
n;r1 (r2)F
n 1(r2)+
R x
r2
n 1;r2 (s)dF
n 1(s)
Fn 1(x) if x 2 (r2; x]
(30)
b
(2)
F (xjno;no) =
8<:no bid if x 2 [x; r2)r2 if x 2 [r2; x] (31)
b
(2)
F (xjb; b(1)F (z)) =
8<:no bid if x 2 [x; r2)r2 if x 2 [r2; x] for each z 2 [r1; r2], b  b(1)F (z) (32)
b
(2)
F (xjb; b(1)F (z)) =
8>>><>>>:
no bid if x 2 [x; r2)
n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; z)
n 1;r2(z) if x 2 [z; x]
for each z 2 (r2; x], b  b(1)F (z) (33)
b
(2)
F (xjb; bw) =
8<:no bid if x 2 [x; r2)n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; x] for each bw > b(1)F (x), bw  b (34)
A crucial feature of b
(1)
F is that it is strictly increasing for x  r1, hence if at least a bid is
submitted at stage one and bw = b
(1)
F (z) for some z  r1, then each losing bidder's beliefs are
given by the c.d.f. which takes value F
n 2(s)
Fn 2(z) if s 2 [x; z), and 1 if s 2 [z; x]. In the case that
bw = b
(1)
F (z) for a z 2 [r1; r2], a losing bidder infers that each other bidder has value smaller
than r2. Therefore bidding r2 suffices to win at stage two, and it is a best reply if the bidder
has value x  r2: see (32), and notice that the same principle holds for (31). Conversely, if
bw = b
(1)
F (z) for a z 2 (r2; x] then each bidder with type x 2 [r2; z) bids n 1;r2(x) as it follows
from (1) with the above beliefs: see (33).
Moving to stage one, the rationale for b
(1)
F is as follows: bidders whose value is between r1 and
r2 only participate in the first auction. From their perspective, they are joining a one shot first
price auction with reserve price r1. As a result, they bid as in the equilibrium of that auction.
Each bidder with value above r2 has two attempts at getting an object. At the second and last
one (along the equilibrium path) he will play the equilibrium bid of a one shot first price auction
with reserve price r2: see (32)-(33). This determines that the equilibrium bidding function for
the first stage is obtained from the differential equation b0(x) = (n 1;r2(x)  b(x)) (n 1)f(x)F (x) for
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x > r2, with the boundary condition b(r2) = n;r1(r2). With respect to (1), the value of type
x is replaced by his stage two bid, as illustrated by GTX, and consistently with the analysis
of Krishna (2010) for a setting without reserve prices.
Figure 2 reports the plots of the equilibrium bidding functions in the first stage with sequen-
tial first price auctions when values are uniformly distributed, there are five bidders, one item
has no reserve price and the other has a reserve price r 2 f0:5; 0:75g. The equilibrium bidding
function for the ascending reserve price auction is given by b
(1)
F in (30) and is plotted in grey.
When r1 = 0:5, the equilibrium bidding function for the descending reserve price auction given
by ~b
(1)
F in (74) and is plotted in black in Figure 2(a) with  =
1:257289
2 and  =
1:365022
2 . When
r1 = 0:75, the equilibrium bidding function for the descending reserve price auction is given by
b^
(1)
S in (21) with  = 0:942 and is plotted in black in Figure 2(b). The cuto values  and  are
the same as in the sequential sealed bid second price auctions in light of Proposition 5.
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(a) Equilibrium bidding functions when r1 = 0 and r2 = 0:5 (grey)
or r1 = 0:5 and r2 = 0 (black)
(b) Equilibrium bidding functions when r1 = 0 and r2 = 0:75
(grey) or r1 = 0:75 and r2 = 0 (black)
Figure 2: Equilibrium bidding function in the first stage of a sequential sealed bid first price
auction when reserve prices are 0 and 0:5 (left) or 0 and 0:75 (right). There are five bidders
with values independently drawn from a uniform distribution in the unit interval
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A Proof of Proposition 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2(i)
We prove that there exists ~r1 2 (r2; r1) such that if r1 2 (r2; ~r1), then there exists a unique
solution to (15)-(16) and there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder bids according to the
strategy (~b
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S ). We employ several steps to obtain this result.
Step 1: Derivation of ~uS(x; x), ~uS(x; ) and ~uS(x; y)
We start by illustrating how ~uS(x; x); ~uS(x; ) and ~uS(x; y) are derived. To this end we need
to determine the updated beliefs, for a bidder who lost at stage one (because either he did not
participate the auction, or he bid r1 or he bid n 1;r2(y)), about the highest value among the
other bidders who did not win at stage one, conditional on the information the bidder learns at
stage one: his own bid at stage one (which we denote with b) and the winning bid at stage one
(which we denote with bw). In order to shorten the notation, we set    F () and   F ().
Step 1.1: Updated beliefs for a bidder who has not bid at stage one, and ~uS(x; x).
Consider a bidder with type x who has made no bid at stage one. Here we describe his beliefs
upon learning bw, and his expected payoff ~uS(x; x) from (5).
 In case there has been no bid by any bidder, an event with probability  n 1 from the
bidder's ex ante point of view, his beliefs are given by the c.d.f. ~G(jno;no) such that
~G(sjno; no) =
8<:
Fn 1(s)
 n 1 if s 2 [x; )
1 if s 2 [; x]
(35)
 In case bw = r1, an event with probability n 1  n 1 from the bidder's ex ante point of
view, his beliefs are given by the c.d.f. ~G(jno; r1) such that
~G(sjno; r1) =
8>>><>>>:
(n 1)(  )
n 1  n 1F
n 2(s) if s 2 [x; )
  
n 1  n 1
Fn 1(s)  n 1
F (s)   if s 2 [; ]
1 if s 2 (; x]
(36)
About the derivation of ~G(sjno; r1), consider the point of view of, say, bidder 1; the
following probabilities refer to the n 1 bidders different from 1. For s 2 [x; ), ~G(sjno; r1)
is obtained by evaluating the probability that exactly one of the other bidders has value
in [; ] and each other bidder has value smaller than s. This probability is equal to
(n  1)(   )Fn 2(s).
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For s 2 [; ], ~G(sjno; r1) is obtained by evaluating the probability that at least one of the
other bidders has value in [; ], none of them has value bigger than , and each of the
non winning bidders with value x 2 [; ] is such that x  s. Such a probability is given
by12
(n  1)(   )
n 2X
j=0
Cn 2;j
j + 1
 n 2 j(F (s)   )j (37)
Specically,      is the probability that a bidder (the winner) has value in [; ] and
we have n   1 possible ways of picking a winner. If there are j other bidders (from the
remaining n   2) whose value is greater than , we need each of them to have value less
than s, and 1j+1 is the probability that our initially selected bidder wins. Remark that
Cn 2;j
j + 1
 n 2 j(F (s)   )j = Cn 1;j+1
(n  1)(F (s)   ) 
n 2 j(F (s)   )j+1 (38)
for j = 0; 1; :::; n 2. The right hand side of (38) is equal to Cn 1;h(n 1)(F (s)  ) n 1 h(F (s)  )h,
for h = 1; 2; :::; n  1 (with h = j + 1). Hence (37) is equal to
(n  1)(   )
n 1X
h=1
Cn 1;h
(n  1)(F (s)   ) 
n 1 h(F (s)   )h =    
F (s)   
 
Fn 1(s)   n 1
 In case bw = ~b(1)S (z) for some z 2 (; x], an event with probability 1 n 1 from the bidder's
ex ante point of view, his beliefs are given by the c.d.f. with value Fn 2(s)=Fn 2(z) if
s 2 [x; z), with value 1 if s 2 [z; x]. In fact, this c.d.f. applies as long as the winning bid
has been ~b
(1)
S (z) for some z 2 (; x], for each stage one bid b ~b(1)S (z); hence we define
~G(sjb;~b(1)S (z)) such that
~G(sjb;~b(1)S (z)) =
8<:
Fn 2(s)
Fn 2(z) if s 2 [x; z)
1 if s 2 [z; x]
for each b ~b(1)S (z) (39)
When he decides to make no bid, the bidder's expected beliefs are represented by the c.d.f. ~Gno
such that
~Gno(s) =  
n 1 ~G(sjno; no) + (n 1    n 1) ~G(sjno; r1) +
Z x

~G(sjno;~b(1)S (z))dFn 1(z)
=
8>>><>>>:
Fn 1(s) + (n  1)(1   )Fn 2(s) if s 2 [x; )
 n 1 + (  )(F
n 1(s)  n 1)
F (s)   + (n  1)(1  )Fn 2(s) if s 2 [; ]
(n  1)Fn 2(s)  (n  2)Fn 1(s) if s 2 (; x]
12For any pair of non negative integers k  h we write Ck;h to denote k!h!(k h)! .
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using (35), (36) and (39). Hence the payoff of a type x from not bidding at stage one is
~uS(x; x) =
Z x
r2
~Gno(s)ds (40)
Step 1.2: Updated beliefs for a bidder who has bid r1 at stage one but has not won
at stage one, and ~uS(x; ). For future convenience, we introduce the following function M ,
defined for a 2 [0; 1] and b 2 [0; 1]:
M(a; b) =
8<:
(n 1)an nan 1b+bn
(a b)2 if a 6= b
n(n 1)
2 a
n 2 if a = b
(41)
Multiplying (a  b)2 by (n  1)an 2 + (n  2)an 3b+ :::+ 2abn 3 + bn 2 reveals that
M(a; b) = (n  1)an 2 + (n  2)an 3b+ :::+ 2abn 3 + bn 2 (42)
and therefore M is strictly increasing both with respect to a and with respect to b.
For a bidder bidding r1, the probability to win at stage one is
~p() =
n 1X
j=0
Cn 1;j
j + 1
 n 1 j(   )j =
n 1X
j=0
Cn;j+1
n(   ) 
n 1 j(   )j+1
=
nX
h=1
Cn;h
n(   ) 
n h(   )h = 
n    n
n(   ) (43)
Let ~p` denote the probability that another bidder wins at stage one with a bid of r1. The
probability that another bidder wins at stage one with a bid ~b
(1)
S (z) for some z 2 (; x] is 1 n 1.
Since ~p() + ~p` + 1  n 1 = 1, it follows that ~p` = n 1   ~p(), that is
~p` =
   
n
M(; ) = (n  1)(   )
n 2X
j=0
Cn 2;j
j + 2
 n 2 j (   )j (44)
Now consider a bidder who has bid r1 at stage one but has not won. Then either bw = r1,
or bw = ~b
(1)
S (z) for some z 2 (; x].
 In case bw = r1 and another bidder has won, an event with probability ~p` from the bidder's
ex ante point of view, his beliefs are given by ~G(jr1; r1) such that
~G(sjr1; r1) =
8>>><>>>:
(n 1)(  )
2~p`
Fn 2(s) if s 2 [x; )
  
n~p`
M(F (s); ) if s 2 [; ]
1 if s 2 (; x]
(45)
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Considering the point of view of bidder 1, the derivation of ~G(sjr1; r1) for s 2 [x; ) is
similar to the derivation of ~G(sjno; r1) for s 2 [x; ), taking into account that bidder 1 has
bid r1 rather than abstaining from bidding.
For s 2 [; ], ~G(sjr1; r1) is obtained from the probability that none of the other bidders
has value greater than , at least one of them has value in [; ] and wins, and each losing
bidder with value x 2 [; ] is such that x  s. This probability is equal to
(n  1)(   )
n 2X
j=0
Cn 2;j
j + 2
 n 2 j(F (s)   )j (46)
From (44) we see that
Pn 2
j=0
Cn 2;j
j+2  
n 2 j(   )j = M(; )n(n 1) . Hence (46) is equal to
(n  1)(   )
n 2X
j=0
Cn 2;j
j + 2
 n 2 j(F (s)   )j =    
n
M(F (s); )
 In case bw = ~b(1)S (z) for some z 2 (; x], an event with probability 1   n 1 from the
bidder's ex ante point of view, then his beliefs are given by ~G(jr1;~b(1)S (z)) in (39).
When he decides to bid r1 at stage one, the bidder expects to lose with probability 1  ~p() =
~p` + 1  n 1, hence his expected beliefs are represented by the c.d.f. ~Gr1 such that
~Gr1(s) =
~p` ~G(sjr1; r1) +
R x

~G(sjr1;~b(1)S (z))dFn 1(z)
1  ~p()
=
1
1  ~p()
8>>><>>>:
(n 1)(2   )
2 F
n 2(s) if s 2 [x; )
  
n M(F (s); ) + (n  1)(1  )Fn 2(s) if s 2 [; ]
(n  1)Fn 2(s)  (n  2)Fn 1(s)  ~p() if s 2 (; x]
using (45) and (39). Hence the payoff of a type x from bidding r1 at stage one is
~uS(x; ) = ~p()(x  r1) + (1  ~p())
Z x
r2
~Gr1(s)ds (47)
Step 1.3: Updated beliefs for a bidder who has bid ~b
(1)
S (y), with y 2 (; x], at stage
one but has not won at stage one, and ~uS(x; y). If a bidder has bid ~b
(1)
S (y) at stage one
and has not won, then bw = ~b
(1)
S (z) for some z  y, and his beliefs are given by ~G(j~b(1)S (y);~b(1)S (z))
in (39). Hence, the payoff of a type x from bidding ~b
(1)
S (y) at stage one, for y 2 (; x], is
~uS(x; y) =
Z y
x

x maxfr1;~b(1)S (z)g

dFn 1(z) +
Z x
y
Z x
r2
~G(sj~b(1)S (y);~b(1)S (z))dsdFn 1(z) (48)
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and notice that the second term is equal to8<:(n  1)(1  F (x))vn 1(x) +
R x
y

vn 1(z)
Fn 2(z) + x  z

dFn 1(z) if y < x
(n  1)(1  F (y))vn 1(x) if y  x
Step 2: Derivation of  and : Existence of a unique solution for (15)-(16), and
definition of ~r1
Using (40), (47), and (48) we find
~uS(; x) = vn() + (n  1)(1   )vn 1()
~uS(; ) = ~p()(   r1) + n  1
2
(2     )vn 1()
~uS(; ) = ~p()(  r1) + (n  1)(   )
2
vn 1() +
+
Z 

   
n
M(F (s); )ds+ (n  1)(1  )vn 1()
lim
y#
~uS(x; y) = 
n 1(x  r1) + (n  1)(1  )vn 1(x)  ~uS(x; +) for x   (49)
Hence (15) and (16) reduce, after some rearranging, respectively to
A(; ) = 0, B(; ) = 0 (50)
with
A(; ) = ~p()(   r1)  (n  1)(   )
2
vn 1()  vn() (51)
B(; ) =
n(n  1)
2
vn 1() M(; )(  r1) +
Z 

M(F (s); )ds (52)
Step 2.1: Definition of . Define () = Fn 1() (  r1)   vn(), a strictly increasing
function such that (r1) < 0 and (x) = r1  r1 > 0. Hence there exists  in the interval (r1; x),
which we denote , such that () < 0 for  2 (r1; ), () = 0, () > 0 for  2 (; x].
Step 2.2: If  2 (r1; ), then there exists no  2 (r1; ] such that A(; ) = 0; if
 2 [; x], then there exists a unique  2 (r1; ] such that A(; ) = 0, denoted
A(). Given a function h of two variables, here and in the remainder of the Appendix we
write hi to denote the partial derivative of h with respect to its i-th variable, i = 1; 2.
First we prove that the function A is strictly increasing with respect to :
A1(; ) =
@~p()
@
(   r1) + n  1
2
f()vn 1() + ~p()  (n  1)(   )
2
 n 2    n 1
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From the definition of ~p() in (43), we see that
~p()  (n  1)(   )
2
 n 2    n 1 =
n 1X
j=2
Cn 1;j
j + 1
 n j 1(   )j > 0
and, moreover, @~p()@ (   r1) > 0 and n 12 f()vn 1() > 0.
Now we examine the sign of A(r1; ) and of A(; ). We have that
A(r1; ) =  (n  1)(  F (r1))
2
vn 1(r1)  vn(r1) < 0
and A(; ) = (). Therefore, if  2 (r1; ) then A(; ) < 0 and there is no solution to
A(; ) = 0 in the interval (r1; ]; if  2 [; x], then there exists (A is continuous in ) a unique
solution to A(; ) = 0 in the interval (r1; ], which we denote A().
Step 2.3: There exists ~r1 2 (r2; r1) such that the equation B(A(); ) = 0 has
a unique solution in (; x) if r1 2 (r2; ~r1); the equation B(A(); ) = 0 has no
solution in (; x) if r1  ~r1. First we prove that B(A(); ) is strictly decreasing in .
Notice that   below is actually equal to F (A()). We have that
dB(A(); )
d
= f(A())
Z 
A
(M2(F (s); )ds M2(; )(  r1)

0A() M1(; )( r1)f()
and we prove that dB(A();)d < 0. From the previous step we have that
0A() =  
A2(; )
A1(; )
=  
@~p
@(A()  r1)  n 12 vn 1(A())f()
@~p
@ (A()  r1) + n 12 vn 1(A())f(A()) + ~p  n 12 (   ) n 2    n 1
(53)
From the proof of Step 2.2 we know that the denominator in the right hand side of (53) is
positive. Therefore dBd has the same sign as
 f(A())

@~p
@
(A   r1)  n  1
2
vn 1(A())f()
 Z 
A()
(M2(F (s); )ds M2(; )(  r1)
!
 M1(; )(  r1)f()

@~p
@
(A()  r1) + n  1
2
vn 1(A)f(A()) +K

(54)
with K = ~p  n 12 (   ) n 2    n 1 > 0. Moreover,
@~p
@
=
M( ;)
n
f(A()),
@~p
@
=
M(; )
n
f()
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hence (54) is smaller than
 f(A())f()

M(; )
n
(A   r1)  n  1
2
vn 1(A())
Z 
A
(M2(F (s); )ds M2(; )(  r1)

 M1(; )(  r1)f()f(A())

M( ;)
n
(A()  r1) + n  1
2
vn 1(A)

which is equal to
 f(A())f()

n  1
2
vn 1(A())

(  r1)M1(; ) + (  r1)M2(; ) 
Z 
A
(M2(F (s); )ds

+
A()  r1
n

M(; )
Z 
A
M2(F (s); )ds+ (  r1) [M1(; )M( ;) M(; )M2(; )]

(55)
We now prove that (55) is negative by showing that the terms inside the square brackets are
positive.
 The inequality A() > r1 implies ( r1)M1(; )+( r1)M2(; ) 
R 
A()
(M2(F (s); )ds >
(  r1)M1(; ) +
R 
A()
(M2(; ) M2(F (s); )) ds, and the right hand side is positive
since M1 > 0 and M2(a; b) =
Pn 3
j=0 (n  2  j)(j + 1)an 3 jbj is strictly increasing a.
 The term M(; ) R A()M2(F (s); )ds is positive since M2 > 0.
 The term M1(; )M( ;)   M(; )M2(; ) is positive. In fact, from (41) we have
M1(a; b) =
(n 1)(n 2)an 2bn+n(n 1)an 2b2 2(n 2)nan 1b
(a b)3 , andM2(a; b) =
(n 2)(an bn)+nab(bn 2 an 2)
(a b)3 .
Therefore,
M1(; )M( ;) M(; )M2(; ) =
n2n 2 
(   )4
 
1  (n  1)2kn 2 + 2n(n  2)kn 1   (n  1)2kn + k2n 2
with k =   2 (0; 1). We now dene
(k) = k2n 2   (n  1)2 kn + 2n (n  2) kn 1   (n  1)2 kn 2 + 1 (56)
and show it is positive for each k 2 (0; 1). Remark that (1) = 0. We now prove
that (k) > 0 for each k 2 (0; 1). We find that 0(k) = kn 3(k), with (k) = 2(n  
1)kn   n (n  1)2 k2 + 2n(n   1) (n  2) k   (n  1)2 (n   2) and (1) = 0. In addition,
we have that  0(k) = 2n(n   1)  kn 1   (n  1) k + n  2, with  0(1) = 0, and  00(k) =
 2n(n   1)2(1   kn 2) < 0 for each k 2 (0; 1). Hence,  0 is strictly decreasing and since
 0(1) = 0 we can conclude that  0(k) > 0 for each k 2 (0; 1). This, in turn, implies that
 is strictly increasing, and since (1) = 0, we obtain that (k) < 0 for each k 2 (0; 1).
31
Therefore 0(k) < 0 for each k 2 (0; 1), and since (1) = 0 we can conclude that (k) > 0
for each k 2 (0; 1).
Now we prove that B(A(
); ) > 0 and then examine the sign of B(A(x); x). Given that
B(A(); ) is a continuous function of , if B(A(x); x) < 0 then there exists a unique ~ 2 (; x)
such that B(A(~); ~) = 0. Since A(A(~); ~) = 0, it follows that A(~); ~ is a solution to (50),
i.e. to (15)-(16). We prove that there exists ~r1 2 (r2; r1) such that B(A(x); x) < 0 if and only
if r1 2 (r2; ~r1).
Regarding B(A(
); ), since A(A(); ) = 0 = () = A(; ), we have that A() =
; hence (42) and (52) imply that
B(A(
); ) =
n(n  1)
2
 
vn 1()  Fn 2()(   r1)

=
n(n  1)
2F ()
Z 
r2
Fn 2(s) (F ()  F (s)) ds > 0
where the last equality follows from the definition of .
Regarding B(A(x); x), we have that
B(A(x); x) =
n(n  1)
2
vn 1(A(x)) M(1; F (A(x)))(x  r1) +
Z x
A(x)
M(F (s); F (A(x)))ds
(57)
We now take into account that A(x) is an increasing function of r1 (
dA(x)
dr1
> 0 since @A@ > 0
and @A@r1 < 0), and we view B(A(x); x) as a function `(r1) of r1 that is defined for r1 2 (r2; r1).
As r1 " r1, we have that A(x)! x and F (A(x))! 1, hence
lim
r"r1
`(r1) =
n(n  1)
2
vn 1(x)  n(n  1)
2
(x  r1) = n(n  1)
2
(vn 1(x)  vn(x)) > 0
As r1 # r2, we have that A(x)! r2, hence
lim
r1#r2
`(r1) =
Z x
r2
(M(F (s); F (r2)) M(1; F (r2))) ds < 0
since F (s) < 1 for s 2 (r2; x). The continuity of ` implies that there exists ~r1 2 (r2; r1) such that
`(~r1) = 0, and `(r1) < 0 for r1 2 (r2; ~r1). The proof that a unique ~r1 exists such that `(~r1) = 0
is long and is reported in E.
Step 3: ~b
(1)
S is strictly increasing in the interval [; x]
It is immediate to see that ~b
(1)
S is strictly increasing in (; x], and here we prove that limx# ~b
(1)
S (x) >
r1, that is (   r1)n 2  vn 1(). Since from B(; ) = 0 in (50) we obtain    r1 =
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1
M(; )

n(n 1)
2 vn 1() +
R 
 M(F (s); )ds

, it is sufficient to establish below that
n(n  1)n 2
2
vn 1() + n 2
Z 

M(F (s); )ds M(; )vn 1() +M(; )
Z 

Fn 2(s)ds
Remark that: (i) the inequality n(n 1)
n 2
2  M(; ) is satisfied as n(n 1)
n 2
2 = M(;) >
M(; ); (ii) the inequality n 2
R 
 M(F (s); )ds M(; )
R 
 F
n 2(s)ds reduces to
Z 

n 2X
j=0
(n  1  j)n 2Fn 2 j(s) j 
Z 

n 2X
j=0
(n  1  j)Fn 2(s)n 2 j j
and it is satisfied since n 2Fn 2 j(s)  Fn 2(s)n 2 j for j = 0; 1; :::; n  2, for s 2 [; ].
Step 4: Proof that no profitable deviation exists
Now that ~b
(1)
S is well defined, we prove that if a bidder expects that each other bidder follows
the strategy (~b
(1)
S ; b
(2)
S ), then no profitable deviation exists for him. Precisely, we prove that the
following inequalities hold:13
for each x 2 [r2; ), ~uS(x; x)  maxf~uS(x; ); ~uS(x; y)g, for each y 2 (; x] (58)
for each x 2 [; ], ~uS(x; )  maxf~uS(x; x); ~uS(x; y)g, for each y 2 (; x] (59)
for each x 2 (; x] and y 2 (; x], ~uS(x; x)  maxf~uS(x; x); ~uS(x; ); ~uS(x; y)g (60)
Step 4.1: Proof of (59) Here we prove that each type in [; ] prefers to bid r1 rather than
not bidding, or bidding ~b
(1)
S (y) for some y 2 (; x].
Bidding r1 is preferred to no bidding. We know from (15) that ~uS(; ) = ~uS(; x), and
now we prove that ~uS1(x; ) > ~uS1(x; x) for each x 2 (; ), which implies ~uS(x; ) > ~uS(x; x)
for each x 2 (; ]. Using (40) and (47) we find that ~uS1(x; x) =  n 1 + (   )F
n 1(x)  n 1
F (x)   +
(n   1)(1   )Fn 2(x), whereas ~uS1(x; ) = ~p() +   n M(F (x); ) + (n   1)(1   )Fn 2(x)
for each x 2 (; ). By using (43) for ~p() and (42) for M(F (x); ), after some rearrangements
we see that ~uS1(x; x) < ~uS1(x; ) is equivalent to M( ;) > M( ; F (x)), which holds since
 > F (x) for each x 2 (; ).
Bidding r1 is preferred to bidding like type y > . From (48) we see that the payoff of
a type x 2 [; ] from bidding ~b(1)S (y) for some y >  is
~uS(x; y) =
Z y
x

x maxfr1;~b(1)S (z)g

dFn 1(z) + (n  1)[1  F (y)]vn 1(x) (61)
13We can neglect bids between r1 and limx# ~b
(1)
S (x), since each bid between r1 and limx# ~b
(1)
S (x) has the same
effect as bidding limx# ~b
(1)
S (x). We can also neglect bids strictly greater than
~b
(1)
S (x) as they cannot increase the
probability of winning while potentially increasing the price to be paid.
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and ~uS2(x; y) = (n   1)f(y)
R y
x (F
n 2(s)   Fn 2(y))ds < 0. Therefore ~uS(x; y) is decreasing in
y, and we consider ~uS(x; 
+) defined in (49). We know from (16) that ~uS(; ) = ~uS(; 
+)
and now we prove that ~uS1(x; 
+) > ~uS1(x; ) for x 2 (; ), therefore ~uS(x; ) > ~uS(x; +) for
x 2 [; ). Precisely, ~uS1(x; +) = n 1 + (n  1)(1  )Fn 2(x) and ~uS1(x; +) > ~uS1(x; ) is
equivalent to M(; ) > M(F (x); ) which holds since  > F (x) for each x 2 (; ).
Step 4.2: Proof of (58) Here we prove that each type in [r2; ) prefers not to bid rather
than bidding r1, or bidding ~b
(1)
S (y) for some y 2 (; x].
No bidding is preferred to bidding r1. We know from (15) that ~uS(; x) = ~uS(; ),
and now we prove that ~uS1(x; x) < ~uS1(x; ) for each x 2 [r2; ), which implies ~uS(x; x) >
~uS(x; ) for each x 2 [r2; ). From (40) and (47) we see that for each x 2 [r2; ) we have
~uS1(x; ) = ~p() +
(n 1)(2   )
2 F
n 2(x), ~uS1(x; x) = Fn 1(x) + (n   1)(1    )Fn 2(x), and
~uS1(x; ) > ~uS1(x; x) reduces to ~p() > F
n 1(x) + n 12 (    )Fn 2(x). We have proved in
Step 2.2 that ~p() >  n 1 + (n 1)2 (    ) n 2, and   > F (x) for each x 2 [r2; ); hence
~uS1(x; ) > ~uS1(x; x) for each x 2 [r2; ).
No bidding is preferred to bidding like type y > . The payoff of each type x 2 [r2; )
from bidding ~b
(1)
S (y) for some y 2 (; x] is given by ~uS(x; y) as in (61) and is decreasing in y. Now
we prove that ~uS(x; 
+) < ~uS(x; x) for each x 2 [r2; ). From (15) and the last remark in the
proof of (59) we know that ~uS(; x) = ~uS(; ) > ~uS(; 
+). We prove below that ~uS1(x; 
+) =
n 1 + (n   1)(1   )Fn 2(x) is greater than ~uS1(x; x) = Fn 1(x) + (n   1)(1    )Fn 2(x),
which implies ~uS(x; x) > ~uS(x; 
+) for each x 2 [r2; ). Precisely, ~uS1(x; +) > ~uS1(x; x) is
equivalent to n 1 > Fn 1(x)+(n 1)(  )Fn 2(x) and holds for each x 2 [r2; ) if and only
if n 1  n 1  (n  1)(  ) n 2  0. This inequality is satisfied since (i) the left hand side
is 0 at  =  ; (ii) the left hand side is increasing in ; (iii)  >  .
Step 4.3: Proof of (60) Here we prove that each type x in (; x] prefers to bid ~b
(1)
S (x) rather
than not bidding, or bidding r1, or bidding ~b
(1)
S (y) for some y 2 (; x], y 6= x.
Bidding ~b
(1)
S (x) is preferred to bidding
~b
(1)
S (y) for some y 6= x. For a type x 2 (; x],
the payoff from bidding as type y 2 (x; x] is ~uS(x; y) as in (61), and is decreasing in y. Therefore,
type x prefers to bid ~b
(1)
S (x) rather than
~b
(1)
S (y) for y > x. Moreover, from (48) we see that the
payoff of type x from bidding as type y 2 (; x) is constant with respect to y, as ~uS2(x; y) =
(n   1)f(y)

yFn 2(y)  ~b(1)S (y)Fn 2(y)  vn 1(y)

= 0 for each y 2 (; x): Therefore bidding
like type y 2 (; x) is no better than bidding ~b(1)S (x).
Bidding ~b
(1)
S (x) is no worse than bidding r1. From (47) we see that ~uS1(x; ) = (n  
1)Fn 2(x) (n 2)Fn 1(x), which is equal to d~uS(x;x)dx . Therefore ~uS(x; ) and ~uS(x; x) have par-
allel graphs in (; x], but (16) implies ~uS(; ) = ~uS(; 
+) = limx# ~uS(x; x), hence ~uS(x; ) =
~uS(x; x) for each x 2 (; x].
Bidding ~b
(1)
S (x) is preferred to no bidding. From (40) we see that ~uS1(x; x) = (n  
1)Fn 2(x)   (n   2)Fn 1(x), which is equal to d~uS(x;x)dx . Therefore ~uS(x; x) and ~uS(x; x) have
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parallel graphs in (; x], but (16) and the proof of (59) imply limx# ~uS(x; x) = ~uS(; +) =
~uS(; ) > ~uS(; x), hence ~uS(x; x) > ~uS(x; x) for x 2 (; x].
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2(ii)
This proof is largely given by the proof of Proposition 2(i), after setting  = x, consistently
with the remark in footnote 7. Precisely, G^(sjno; r1) in (9) and G^(sjr1; r1) in (11) can be seen
as special cases of (36) and (45) with  = x and  = 1. Remark that the probability of winning
when bidding r1 is now given by (see (43) with  = 1)
p^() =
n 1X
j=0
Cn 1;j
j + 1
 n 1 j(1   )j = 1   
n
n(1   ) (62)
and in (11), 1   p^() replaces ~p` at the denominator because 1   p^() is a bidder's probability
of losing after a bid of r1 given b^
(1)
S , the analog of ~p`.
The proofs that a unique solution to (13) exists and that u^S(x; x)  u^S(x; ) for each
x 2 [r2; ) and u^S(x; x)  u^S(x; ) for each x 2 (; x] are special cases of Steps 2.2, 4.1, and 4.2
in the proof of Proposition 2(i).
Finally, we need to explore the profitability of bidding slightly more than r1 and to prove that
maxfu^S(x; x); u^S(x; )g  x   r1 holds for each x 2 [r2; x]. Since u^S1(x; x) < 1 for x 2 [r2; )
and u^S1(x; ) < 1 for x 2 [; x], it suffices to prove that u^S(x; )  x   r1. Using (12) and
rearranging the inequality we obtain
n(n  1)
2
vn 1() +
Z x

M(F (s); )ds M(1; )(x  r1)  0 (63)
In examining this inequality, we need to take into account that  is the unique solution to (13)
given r1. Since (13) is equivalent to (15) (i.e., to A(; ) = 0 in (50) when  = x), it follows that
the left hand side of (63) is a function of r1 which coincides with `(r1) introduced in Step 2.3 in
the proof of Proposition 2(i). From Step 2.3 we know that `(r1)  0 if and only if r1 2 [~r1; r1].
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2(iii)
The proof of this part (from GTX) has been already presented in subsection 3.2.1.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: limn!+1 ~r1 = x:
Recalling Step 2.3 in the proof of Proposition 2(i), we here show that for each r1 < x, B(A(x); x)
is negative for a large n; this implies that ~r1 > r1 and that a solution to (50) exists. Precisely,
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given r1 < x we find
B(A(x); x) =
n(n  1)
2
Z A(x)
r2
Fn 2(s)ds  n  1  nF (A(x)) + F
n(A(x))
(1  F (A(x)))2 (x  r1)
+
Z x
A(x)
(n  1)Fn(s)  nFn 1(s)F (A(x)) + Fn(A(x))
(F (s)  F (A(x)))2 ds
and the first and third term tend to zero; the second term tends to  1. Hence B(A(x); x) < 0
if n is large.
Step 2: limn!+1  = limn!+1  = r1:
Since for each n we have r1 <  < , it suffices to prove that limn!+1  = r1. Then, recalling
Step 2.3 in the proof of Proposition 2(i), we now show that B(A(); ) is negative at  = r1+"
for a large n; this implies that the  solution is smaller than r1 + " for a large n. For the sake
of brevity, we write A instead of A(r1 + "), and recall that r1 < A < r1 + ". The inequality
B(A; r1 + ") < 0 is equivalent to
" >
1
M(F (r1 + "); F (A))

n(n  1)
2
vn 1(A) +
Z r1+"
A
M(F (s); F (A))ds

(64)
and now we show that (64) is satisfied for a large n. First notice that
n(n 1)
2 vn 1(A)
M(F (r1 + "); F (A))
<
n(n 1)
2 vn 1(A)
M(F (A); F (A))
=
Z A
r2

F (s)
F (A)
n 2
ds
Hence the first term in the right hand side of (64) tends to zero. Regarding the second term in
the right hand side of (64), we need to consider two cases:
 If A  r1+ "2 , then consider three numbers b, a, c in [0; 1], such that b < a < c and notice
that
M(a; b)
M(c; b)
=

c  b
a  b
2 (n  1)(ac )n   n(ac )n 1 bc + ( bc)n
n  1  bcn+ ( bc)n
tends to zero. Then we conclude that
R r1+"
A
M(F (s);F (A))
M(F (r1+");F (A))
ds tends to zero by taking
c = F (r1 + "), a = F (s), b = F (A). Hence, (64) is satisfied for a large n.
 If instead A > r1 + "2 , we have thatR r1+"
A
M(F (s); F (A))ds
M(F (r1 + "); F (A))
<
M(F (r1 + "); F (A))(r1 + "  A)
M(F (r1 + "); F (A))
= r1 + "  A < "
2
Since
R A
r2

F (s)
F (A)
n 2
ds < 14" for a large n, it follows that the right hand side in (64) is
smaller than 34", and (64) is satisfied.
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C Proof of Proposition 4
Let x = (x1; :::; xn), X = (X1; :::; Xn), and given a sequence of reserve prices (increasing or
decreasing) and an equilibrium for sequential second price auctions, for i = 1; :::; n we use qi(x)
to denote the probability that bidder i wins an object (either in stage one or in stage two)
in that equilibrium, given the profile x of values. Moreover, in each equilibrium described by
Propositions 1 and 2 the expected payoff of each bidder with value 0 is equal to zero, therefore
arguing as in Myerson (1981) we find that the sellers' total payoff is given by
 = E [(X1)q1(X) +   + (Xn)qn(X)]  rPrfthe object with reserve price r is soldg (65)
We have introduced in the main text the order statistics. Here we introduce y = (y1; : : : ; yn),
Y = (Y1; : : : ; Yn), and the joint density of Y is
fY(y1; : : : ; yn) =
(
n!f(y1)f(y2)    f(yn) if y1  y2      yn
0 otherwise
(66)
In case of increasing reserve prices, that is r1 = 0, r2 = r, let irp denote the profit in (65)
given q1; :::; qn;Prfthe object with reserve price r is soldg resulting from the equilibrium described
by Proposition 1. Neglecting ties, that are zero probability events, for each bidder i we have
that qi(x) = 1 if xi = y1 or xi = y2  r, otherwise qi(x) = 0. This reveals that irp is equal to
the expectation of the following function irp:
irp(y) =
8<:(y1) if y2 < r(y1) + (y2)  r if r  y2 (67)
Likewise, if reserve prices are decreasing (that is r1 = r, r2 = 0), we denote the profit in (65)
as drp, or ^drp, or ~drp depending on which case of Proposition 2 applies, and in each of these
cases the profit can be written as the expectation of a suitable function of y:
 If r1  r, then drp = E[drp(Y)] with
drp(y) = (y1) (68)
 If ~r1  r < r1, then ^drp = E[^drp(Y)] with
^drp(y) =
8>>><>>>:
(y1) if y1 < 
(y1) + (y2)  r if y3 <   y1
(y1) +
2
m(y2) +
1
m(y3) +   + 1m(ym)  r if ym+1 <   ym; m  3
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 If r < ~r1, then ~drp = E[~drp(Y)] with
~drp(y) =
8>>><>>>:
(y1) if y1 < 
(y1) + (y2)  r if y3 <  < y1  , or  < y1
(y1) +
2
m(y2) +
1
m(y3) +   + 1m(ym)  r if ym+1 <   ym  y1  ; m  3
Notice that the last line in ^drp and the last line in ~drp take into account that in stage one
the winner is selected randomly when Proposition 2 (i)-(ii) applies and at least two bidders have
values in [; x] (for ^drp) or in [; ] (for ~drp).
C.1 Proof of Proposition 4(i)
From (67) and (68) we see that
irp(y)  drp(y) =
8<:0 if y2 < r(y2)  r if r  y2
that is irp and drp differ only when y2  r. From (66) it follows that the density of Y2 is
f2(y2) = n(n  1)f(y2)[1  F (y2)]Fn 2(y2), hence
(r)  irp  drp = E[irp(Y)  drp(Y)] =
Z 1
r
((y2) r)n(n 1)f(y2)[1 F (y2)]Fn 2(y2)dy2
(69)
with (1) = 0, and
0(r) = (n  1)2Fn(r)  n(2n  3)Fn 1(r) + n(n  1)Fn 2(r)  1
00(r) = n(n  1)2Fn 3(r)f(r)[1  F (r)]

n  2
n  1   F (r)

with 0(1) = 0. We let r0 be such that F (r0) = n 2n 1 , and distinguish the case of r
0  r1 from
the case of r1 < r
0.
In the first case we have 00(r) < 0 for each r 2 (r1; 1), therefore 0 is strictly decreasing in
[r1; 1], and since 
0(1) = 0 it follows that 0(r) > 0 for each r 2 (r1; 1). Then, from (1) = 0
we conclude that (r) < 0 for each r 2 [r1; 1).
In the second case we have 00(r) > 0 for r 2 (r1; r0) and 00(r) < 0 for r 2 (r0; 1), therefore 0
is strictly increasing in (r1; r
0), is strictly decreasing in (r0; 1). Since 0(1) = 0, it follows that
0 is positive in an interval (r00; x) such that r00 < r0 and r00 may be equal to r1; if r00 = r1 holds,
then we conclude that (r) < 0 for each r 2 [r1; 1), as in the first case. Conversely, if r1 < r00,
then 0(r) < 0 in (r1; r00), 0(r) > 0 in (r00; x). Since (1) = 0, it follows that (r) is negative
in an interval (r000; 1) such that r000 < r00 and r000 may be equal to r1. In any case, if (r1)  0
then (r) < 0 for each r 2 (r1; 1).
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C.2 Proof of (19)
For each r 2 (0; 1), rirp = E[maxfY3   r; 0g]. We show that for each r 2 (0; 1), rdrp < rirp
holds.
This is clearly true when rdrp = 0, which happens for all r  ~r1 (under drp, in fact, no
bidder bids at stage one for r  r1, and no bidder bids more than r for r 2 [~r1; r1)) and for
r 2 (0; ~r1) if y2   (here again the second largest bid does not exceed r).
Finally, when r 2 (0; ~r1) and y2 > , we have that the profits under drp are given by
n 1;0(y2)  r. From (20) we can derive the following equality
n 1;0(y2)  r = E(Y3   rjY2 = y2) < E(maxfY3   r; 0gjY2 = y2)
while the inequality follows because when y2 >  we have that Y3 is smaller than r with positive
probability. Therefore rdrp < 
r
irp also if r 2 (0; ~r1).
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4(ii)
Given (19), here it suffices to show that 0irp > 
0
drp. In order to do this, we denote with !(y2)
the expected difference in profit (from the sale of the object with zero reserve price) between
irp and drp given Y2 = y2: hence 
0
irp   0drp =
R 1
0 !(y2)f2(y2)dy2. It is useful to distinguish
between the following cases: y2 2 (0; r], y2 2 (r; ], and y2 >  and writeZ 1
0
!(y2)f2(y2)dy2 =
Z r
0
!(y2)f2(y2)dy2 +
Z 
r
!(y2)f2(y2)dy2 +
Z 1

!(y2)f2(y2)dy2
Steps 2-4 below imply that
R 1
0 !(y2)f2(y2)dy2 > 0 for r close to zero, but first we need to prove a
property of . For the rest of this proof we define f  minx2[0;1] f(x) > 0, f  maxx2[0;1] f(x) 
f .
Step 1: There exists a  > 1 such that  < r when r is close to zero
We can verify that B in (52) is strictly decreasing in both variables and from the proof of
Proposition 2 (Step 2.3) we know that there exists a solution ;  to (50) such that r <  < 
exists. We now prove that B(r; r) < 0 for a suitable  > 1, and this implies that B(; z) < 0
for each   r and for each z  r; therefore  < r. We have that
B(r; z) =
n(n  1)
2
Z r
0
Fn 2(s)ds M(F (z); F (r))(z   r) +
Z z
r
M(F (s); F (r))ds
with B(r; r) = n(n 1)2
R r
0 F
n 2(s)ds > 0 and B2(r; z) =  M1(F (z); F (r))f(z)(z  r) < 0. Hence,
B(r; z) =
n(n  1)
2
Z r
0
Fn 2(s)ds 
Z z
r
M1(F (s); F (r))f(s)(s  r)ds
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and
M1(F (s); F (r)) = (n  1)(n  2)Fn 3(s) + (n  2)(n  3)Fn 4(s)F (r) + :::+ 2Fn 3(r)
= Fn 3(r)
 
(n  1)(n  2)

F (s)
F (r)
n 3
+ (n  2)(n  3)

F (s)
F (r)
n 4
+ :::+ 2
!
 Fn 3(r)
n 2X
j=1
j(j + 1) =
n(n  1)(n  2)
3
Fn 3(r)
where the inequality follows because s  r. Since
F (r) =
Z r
0
f(s)ds 
Z r
0
fds = r f (70)
we have that
B(r; z) <
n(n  1)
2
rFn 2(r)  n(n  1)(n  2)
3
Fn 3(r)f
Z z
r
(s  r)ds
<
n(n  1)
2
Fn 3(r)

r2 f   n  2
3
f(z   r)2

and the right hand side is equal to zero if z = r, with  = 1 +
r
3 f
(n 2)f .
Step 2:
R r
0 !(y2)f2(y2)dy2 > 0
Given y2 2 (0; r], we find that the profit under irp is y2, whereas the profit under drp is y3 if
y1  , or y2 if y1 < ; this implies that !(y2) = E[(y2   Y3)1fY1gjY2 = y2] > 0 for y2  r,
hence
R r
0 !(y2)f2(y2)dy2 > 0.
Step 3:
R 
r !(y2)f2(y2)dy2 >  1rn for a suitable 1 > 0
Given y2 2 (r; ], we find that the profit under irp is n 1;0(y2), whereas the profit under drp
is y3 (if at stage one the highest or the second highest value bidder wins), or y2 (if at stage one
the highest or the second highest value bidder does not win). Therefore the profit difference is
necessarily larger than n 1;0(r)  = r  >  ( 1)r. As a result,
R 
r !(y2)f2(y2)dy2 >  ( 
1)r
R 
r f2(y2)dy2. Now observe that
R 
r f2(y2)dy2 <
R 
r n(n   1) fn 1yn 22 dy2 < n( f)n 1rn 1,
where the first inequality follows again from (70). The result is then obtained once we let
1 = (   1)n( f)n 1.
Step 4:
R 1
 !(y2)f2(y2)dy2  2rn 1 for a suitable 2 > 0
Given y2 > , we have described in the main text (see page 16) that !(y2) =
R r
0 F
n 2(s)ds
Fn 2(y2) , andR 1
 !(y2)f2(y2)dy2 =
n(n 1)(1 )2
2
R r
0 F
n 2(s)ds  n(n 1)(1 )22
R r
0 (fs)
n 2ds = 2rn 1 where the
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inequality follows by using the logic in (70) and using f instead, and by letting 2 =
n(1 )2fn 2
2 .
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4(iii)
When the values are uniformly distributed, we know that r1 =
n 1
n and we can verify that
(x) = 2x  1 is an increasing function.
C.4.1 Case of r1  r
For each n  3 we prove that (r1) < 0, and then Proposition 4(i) implies that (r) < 0 for
each r 2 (r1; 1). From (69) we find
(r1) =
8n2   7n+ 1
n (n2   1)

1  1
n
n
  3n
2   4n+ 1
8n2   7n+ 1

and (1  1n)n   3n
2 4n+1
8n2 7n+1 is equal to   4351 < 0 for n = 3, is equal to   26725 856 < 0 for n = 4. We
now prove that (1  1n)n  3n
2 4n+1
8n2 7n+1 < 0 for each n  5, which implies (r1) < 0. We have that
1  1
n
n
=
nX
k=0
Cn;k

  1
n
k
= 1  1 +
4X
k=2
Cn;k

  1
n
k
+
nX
k=5
Cn;k

  1
n
k
Now consider the case of n even, because when n is odd the last term in the sum above is
negative and so makes our point easier. We have that
nX
k=5
Cn;k

  1
n
k
=
(n 2)=2X
k=2

 Cn;2k+1 1
n2k+1
+ Cn;2k+2
1
n2k+2

and
 Cn;2k+1 1
n2k+1
+ Cn;2k+2
1
n2k+2
=  (2k + 1)Cn+1;2k+2
n2k+2
< 0
for k = 2; :::; n 22 . Therefore
1  1
n
n
<
4X
k=2
Cn;k

  1
n
k
=
(n  1)  3n2 + n+ 2
8n3
Last,
(n  1)  3n2 + n+ 2
8n3
  3n
2   4n+ 1
8n2   7n+ 1 =   (n  1)
n (n  1) (5n  7) + 6n  2
8n3(8n2   7n+ 1) < 0
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C.4.2 Case of 0 < r < ~r1
When r < ~r1, recall that  and  are solutions of (50), and from Subsection 3.4 we know that
 = cr,  = cr. Moreover we have that:
irp(y) ~drp(y) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if y1 <  and y2 < r, or y3 <   y1  , or  < y1
(y2)  r if r  y2  y1 < 
r   (y2) if y2 < r <   y1
m 2
m (y2)  1m(y3)       1m(ym) if ym+1 <   ym  y1  ; m  3
(71)
Since  is increasing, it follows that m 2m (y2)  1m(y3)       1m(ym)  0. Therefore ~(r) 
irp   ~drp = E[irp(Y)  ~drp(Y)] is such that
~(r) 
Z 
r
Z 
y2
((y2)  r)f1;2(y1; y2)dy1dy2 +
Z r
0
Z 1

(r   (y2))f1;2(y1; y2)dy1dy2
= n(n  1)
Z cr
r
(2y2   1  r) (cr   y2)yn 22 dy2 + (1  cr)
Z r
0
(r   2y2 + 1) yn 22 dy2

= rn 1W (c ; r)
in which f1;2(y1; y2) = n(n  1)yn 22 is the joint density of Y1; Y2, obtained from (66), and
W (c ; r)  n  (2n  3 + cn)r +
(n  1)2 + (2c(n  1)  n  1)cn
n+ 1
r2
From the proof of Proposition 2(i) (Step 2.3), we know that the function B defined in (52) is
strictly decreasing in both its variables. Therefore if z is the unique solution to B(z; z) = 0,
then ;  solutions to (50) are such that  < z < . The equation B(z; z) = 0 is equivalent to
n(n 1)
2
R z
0 s
n 2ds  n(n 1)2 zn 2(z   r) = 0, hence z = n 1n 2r and c < n 1n 2 < c, ~r1 = 1c < n 2n 1 .
Step 1: W is strictly decreasing with respect to its first variable. Therefore,
W (c; r) > W (
n 1
n 2 ; r). We have thatW1(c ; r) = c
n 1
 r (2cr(n  1)  n  nr), and 2cr(n 
1)  n  nr < 2n 1n 2 n 2n 1(n  1)  n  nn 2n 1 =  n 2n 1 < 0 since c < n 1n 2 and r < n 2n 1 .
Step 2: For each n  4 we have W (n 1
n 2 ; r) > 0 for each r  5n 125n 5 . We find that
W (n 1n 2 ;
5n 12
5n 5 ) > 0 for each n  4 since
W

n 1
n 2 ;
5n 12
5n 5

=
(5n  12) (17n2   61n+ 58)
25 (n+ 1) (n  2) (n  1)2

2 (127n  162) (n  1) (n  2)
(5n  12) (17n2   61n+ 58)  

n  1
n  2
n
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and, therefore, W (n 1n 2 ;
5n 12
5n 5 ) =
344
1125 > 0 for n = 4, while for n  5 we have that
2 (127n  162) (n  1) (n  2)
(5n  12) (17n2   61n+ 58)  

n  1
n  2
n
>
2 (127n  162) (n  1) (n  2)
(5n  12) (17n2   61n+ 58)  
275
100

n  1
n  2
2
=
(n  1)   (27n  8)2 + 5534 (n  5)2 + 23 742(n  5) + 3168
36 (5n  12) (17n2   61n+ 58) (n  2)2 > 0
Moreover, W (n 1n 2 ; 1) =   2(n 3)(n+1)(n 2)

n 1
n 2
n   2  2n 3 is negative for each n  4. Since
W (n 1n 2 ; r) is a convex quadratic function of r, it follows that W (
n 1
n 2 ; r) > 0 for each r 2
(0; 5n 125n 5 ].
Step 3: ~(r) > 0 for each r  minf5n 12
5n 5 ; ~r1g. If ~r1  5n 125n 5 , then Steps 1 and 2 establish
that W (c ; r) > W (
n 1
n 2 ; ~r1) > 0 for each r 2 (0; ~r1). If ~r1 > 5n 125n 5 , then Steps 1 and 2 establish
that W (c ; r) > W (
n 1
n 2 ;
5n 12
5n 5 ) > 0 for each r 2 (0; 5n 125n 5 ).
C.4.3 Case of n = 3
Given n = 3, we computed (see Table 1) ~r1 = 2
p
3  3 and r1 = 23 . We have proved above that
irp   ~drp < 0 for each r 2 [r1; 1] (for each n  3). Here we consider r 2 (0; 23).
When r 2 (0; 2p3  3), we use (71) to find that ~(r) = irp   ~drp is equal toZ 
r
Z 
y2
(2y2   1  r)6y2dy1dy2 +
Z r
0
Z 1

(r   2y2 + 1)6y2dy1dy2 +
Z 

Z y1

Z y2

(
2
3
y2   2
3
y3)6dy3dy2dy1
=
7
6
4   (r + 2
3
+ 1)3 + 22   2
3
3 + r4   3r3 + 3r2 + 1
6
4
and we know from subsection 3.4 that  = (1 + 13
p
3)r,  = (1 + 23
p
3)r, hence ~(r) =
r2(36
p
3+115
54 r
2   45+10
p
3
9 r + 3) is positive for each r 2 (0; 2
p
3  3).
When r 2 [2p3  3; 23), in order to evaluate ^(r)  irp   ^drp = E[irp(Y)  ^drp(Y)] we
use
irp(y)  ^drp(y) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if y1 <  and y2 < r, or y3 <   y1 and r  y2
(y2)  r if r  y2  y1 < 
r   (y2) if   y1 and y2 < r
1
3(y2)  13(y3) if   y3
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Figure 3: Plot of ^(r) when n = 3 and r 2 (2p3  3; 2=3).
Therefore
^(r) =
Z 
r
Z y1
r
(2y2   1  r)6y2dy2dy1 +
Z 1

Z r
0
(r   2y2 + 1)6y2dy2dy1
+
Z 1

Z y1

Z y2

(
2
3
y2   2
3
y3)6dy3dy2dy1
=
7
6
4   (r + 5
3
)3 + 2   2
3
 + r4   3r3 + 3r2 + 1
6
(72)
The value of  is determined as the unique solution in the interval (r; 1) to the equation 33  
2 + 2   2(1 +  + 2)r = 0 (from (51) with  = 1). Hence we find
 =
1
9
(2r + 1) +
1
9
3
q
8r3 + 66r2 + 222r   26 + 9
p
3
p
12r4 + 112r3 + 276r2   126r + 23
+
4r2 + 22r   17
9
3
p
8r3 + 66r2 + 222r   26 + 9p3p12r4 + 112r3 + 276r2   126r + 23
(73)
Inserting (73) into (72) reveals that the graph of ^ in the interval [2
p
3  3; 23) is as in Figure 3,
and ^(r) = 0 if and only if r = 0:641.
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D Proof for Proposition 5
D.1 Proof of Proposition 5(i)
Consider r1 2 (r2; ~r1), and let ;  be the unique solution to (15)-(16). Here we prove that the
following bidding functions constitute an equilibrium:14
~b
(1)
F (x) =
8>>><>>>:
no bid if x 2 [x; )
r1 if x 2 [; ]R x
x
maxfr1;~b(1)S (s)gdFn 1(s)
Fn 1(x) if x 2 (; x]
(74)
~b
(2)
F (xjno; no) =
8<:n;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; )n;r2() if x 2 [; x] (75)
~b
(2)
F (xjno; r1) =
8>>><>>>:
n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; )
~b
(2)
F (~y(x)jr1; r1) such that ~y(x) is in
argmaxy2[;](x  ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~G(yjno; r1)
if x 2 [; x]
(76)
~b
(2)
F (xjr1; r1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; )
n 1;r2 () ~G(jr1;r1)+
R x
 s~g(sjr1;r1)ds
~G(xjr1;r1) if x 2 [; ]
n 1;r2 () ~G(jr1;r1)+
R 
 s~g(sjr1;r1)ds
~G(jr1;r1) if x 2 (; x]
(77)
~b
(2)
F (xjb;~b(1)F (z)) =
8<:n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; z)n 1;r2(z) if x 2 [z; x] for each z 2 (; x], b  ~b(1)F (z) (78)
~b
(2)
F (xjb; bw) =
n
n 1;r2(x) if x 2 [r2; x] for each bw > ~b
(1)
F (x), bw  b (79)
Remark that, in light of ~b
(1)
F (x),
~b
(2)
F (xjno;no) for x 2 [; x], ~b(2)F (xjno; r1) for x 2 [; x],
~b
(2)
F (xjr1; r1) for x =2 [; ], ~b(2)F (xjb;~b(1)F (z)) for x 2 [z; x], and ~b(2)F (xjb; bw) for x 2 [x; x] re-
late to off-the-equilibrium play. Remark also that ~b
(2)
F (xjr1; r1) is constant for x 2 (; x].
Step 1: Proof for stage two
In this first step we prove that for each possible outcome at stage one, the bidding specified
by (75)-(79) constitutes an equilibrium at stage two. We start by noticing that ~b
(1)
F generates
the same stage two beliefs for losing bidders as ~b
(1)
S . Precisely, by comparing (74) with (14), we
see that this property is true if bw = no, or if bw = r1; in these cases the updated beliefs are
given by (35), (36), and (45). But the property is true also if bw = ~b
(1)
F (z) for some z 2 (; x],
14For the sake of brevity, in each bidding function relative to stage two we consider only x  r2, since each type
with value smaller than r2 does not bid at stage two, regardless of the outcome of stage one.
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as ~b
(1)
S is strictly increasing in the interval (; x]: in this case the updated beliefs are given by
the c.d.f.
~G(sjb;~b(1)F (z)) =
8<:
Fn 2(s)
Fn 2(z) if s 2 [x; z)
1 if s 2 [z; x]
for each b ~b(1)F (z) (80)
which is essentially equivalent to (39) for each z 2 (; x], b ~b(1)F (z).
Regarding ~b
(2)
F (jno;no) in (75), we can argue as for (22), and regarding ~b(2)F (jb; bw) in (79)
we can argue as for (25).
In order to consider the case in which bw = r1 (the bidding functions (76) and (77)) we first
prove a stochastic dominance relation between ~G(jr1; r1) and ~G(jno; r1).
Step 1.1: ~G(jr1; r1) dominates ~G(jno; r1) in terms of the reverse hazard rate.
~g(sjno; r1)
~G(sjno; r1)
=
~g(sjr1; r1)
~G(sjr1; r1)
for s 2 [x; ), ~g(sjno; r1)
~G(sjno; r1)
<
~g(sjr1; r1)
~G(sjr1; r1)
for s 2 (; ]
It is immediate to verify that ~g(sjno;r1)~G(sjno;r1) =
~g(sjr1;r1)
~G(sjr1;r1) for each s 2 [x; ). Now consider s 2 (; ],
and in order to prove that ~g(sjno;r1)~G(sjno;r1) <
~g(sjr1;r1)
~G(sjr1;r1) , notice that
~g(sjno; r1)
~G(sjno; r1)
=
f(s)
F (s)   
(n  1)Fn 2(s)(F (s)   )  (Fn 1(s)   n 1)
Fn 1(s)   n 1 ,
~g(sjr1; r1)
~G(sjr1; r1)
=
f(s)
F (s)   
n(n  1)Fn 2(s)(F (s)   )2   2[(n  1)Fn(s)  nFn 1(s)  +  n]
(n  1)Fn(s)  nFn 1(s)  +  n
After defining k   F (s) 2 (0; 1), we can write ~g(sjr1;r1)~G(sjr1;r1)  
~g(sjno;r1)
~G(sjno;r1) as
f(s)
F (s)   

n(n  1)(1  k)2   2(n  1  nk + kn)
n  1  nk + kn  
(n  1)(1  k)  1 + kn 1
1  kn 1

and rearranging the last expression, we see that it has the same sign as
k2n 2   (n  1)2 kn + 2n (n  2) kn 1   (n  1)2 kn 2 + 1
Remark that this is the equal to (k) in (56) that we know is positive for each k 2 (0; 1).
Step 1.2: The bidding function ~b
(2)
F (jno; r1). Consider a bidder of type x  r2 who has
submitted no bid at stage one, and has learned that bw = r1. Then his beliefs on the highest
value among the other losing bidders are given by ~G(sjno; r1) in (36), and we prove that it is
optimal for him to bid ~b
(2)
F (xjno; r1) as specified in (76) if he expects each other losing bidder
with value in [r2; ) to bid according to ~b
(2)
F (jno; r1), and each other losing bidder with value in
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[; ] to bid according to ~b
(2)
F (jr1; r1) in (77).15
In detail, we formulate his bidding problem as the problem of selecting optimally y 2 [r2; ],
with the interpretation that choosing y 2 [r2; ) is equivalent to bidding ~b(2)F (yjno; r1), and
choosing y 2 [; ] is equivalent to bidding ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1). Therefore, for this type of bidder the
stage two payoff is
~u
(2)
F (x; yjno; r1) =
8<:(x  ~b
(2)
F (yjno; r1)) ~G(yjno; r1) if y 2 [r2; )
(x  ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~G(yjno; r1) if y 2 [; ]
and
@~u
(2)
F (x; yjno; r1)
@y
=
8>><>>:
~G(yjno; r1)

 @~b
(2)
F (yjno;r1)
@y + (x  ~b
(2)
F (yjno; r1)) ~g(yjno;r1)~G(yjno;r1)

if y 2 [r2; )
~G(yjno; r1)

 @~b
(2)
F (yjr1;r1)
@y + (x  ~b
(2)
F (yjr1; r1)) ~g(yjno;r1)~G(yjno;r1)

if y 2 (; ]
Then notice that ~b
(2)
F (jno; r1) and ~b(2)F (jr1; r1) satisfy the following differential equations in
[r2; ) and in (; ], respectively:
@~b
(2)
F (yjno; r1)
@y
= (y   ~b(2)F (yjno; r1))
~g(yjno; r1)
~G(yjno; r1)
for y 2 [r2; ) (81)
@~b
(2)
F (yjr1; r1)
@y
= (y   ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1))
~g(yjr1; r1)
~G(yjr1; r1)
for y 2 (; ] (82)
and find that
@~u
(2)
F (x;yjno;r1)
@y =
8<:(x  y)~g(yjno; r1) if y 2 [r2; )~G(yjno; r1) (y   ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~g(yjr1;r1)~G(yjr1;r1) + (x  ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~g(yjno;r1)~G(yjno;r1) if y 2 (; ]
Consider a type x 2 [r2; ). Then @~u
(2)
F (x;yjno;r1)
@y is positive for y 2 [r2; x), negative for
y 2 (x; ), and negative also for y 2 (; ] because ~g(yjr1;r1)~G(yjr1;r1) >
~g(yjno;r1)
~G(yjno;r1) for y 2 (; ] implies
 (y ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~g(yjr1;r1)~G(yjr1;r1)+(x ~b
(2)
F (yjr1; r1)) ~g(yjno;r1)~G(yjno;r1) < (x y)
~g(yjno;r1)
~G(yjno;r1) < 0 given x <  < y.
Hence the optimal y is equal to x, i.e. the optimal bid is ~b
(2)
F (xjno; r1).
Now consider a type x 2 [; x]. Then @~u
(2)
F (x;yjno;r1)
@y > 0 for y 2 [r2; ), hence the optimal
y is in [; ], as specified by (76). Moreover, we have seen above that
@~u
(2)
F (x;yjno;r1)
@y  (x  
y)~g(yjno; r1) for y 2 (; ], hence for x =  the optimal y is equal to .
Step 1.3: The bidding function ~b
(2)
F (jr1; r1). Consider a bidder of type x  r2 who has
bid r1 at stage one, and has learned that another bidder has won at stage one with a bid r1.
15In view of ~G(jno; r1), he expects that no losing bidder has value greater than .
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Then his beliefs on the highest value among the other losing bidders at stage one are given
by ~G(sjr1; r1) in (45) and we prove that it is optimal for him to bid ~b(2)F (xjr1; r1) as specified
in (77) if he expects each other losing bidder with value in [r2; ) to bid according to ~b
(2)
F (jno; r1)
in (76), and each other losing bidder with value in [; ] to bid according to ~b
(2)
F (jr1; r1).16
Arguing as in the proof of Step 1.2, we can write the bidder's payoff at stage two as a function
of y as follows:
~u
(2)
F (x; yjr1; r1) =
8<:(x  ~b
(2)
F (yjno; r1)) ~G(yjr1; r1) if y 2 [r2; )
(x  ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~G(yjr1; r1) if y 2 [; ]
and
@~u
(2)
F (x; yjr1; r1)
@y
=
8>><>>:
~G(yjr1; r1)

 @~b
(2)
F (yjno;r1)
@y + (x  ~b
(2)
F (yjno; r1)) ~g(yjr1;r1)~G(yjr1;r1)

if y 2 [r2; )
~G(yjr1; r1)

 @~b
(2)
F (yjr1;r1)
@y + (x  ~b
(2)
F (yjr1; r1)) ~g(yjr1;r1)~G(yjr1;r1)

if y 2 (; ]
Then we use (81)-(82) plus ~g(yjno;r1)~G(yjno;r1) =
~g(yjr1;r1)
~G(yjr1;r1) for y 2 [r2; ) to find
@~u
(2)
F (x; yjr1; r1)
@y
=
8<:(x  y)~g(yjr1; r1) if y 2 [r2; )(x  y)~g(yjr1; r1) if y 2 (; ]
This reveals that the optimal y is equal to x for each x 2 [r2; ]; and it is equal to , for each
x 2 (; x]. Hence, in either case, the optimal bid is ~b(2)F (xjr1; r1).
Step 1.4: The bidding function ~b
(2)
F (jb;~b(1)F (z)). If bw = ~b(1)F (z) for some z 2 (; x], then
the beliefs of each losing bidder are given by the c.d.f. ~G(jb;~b(1)F (z)) in (80). Then essentially
the argument relative to b^
(2)
F (xjno;no) in (22) applies in this case. We find that
~g(sjb;~b(1)F (z))
~G(sjb;~b(1)F (z))
=
(n  2)f(s)
F (s)
for s 2 (r2; z)
hence (1) reveals that the equilibrium bidding function for x 2 [r2; z) is n 1;r2(x), as specified
by ~b
(2)
F (jb;~b(1)F (z)). Finally, given bw = ~b(1)F (z), a type x 2 [z; x] expects each other bidder to
have value smaller than z, and n 1;r2(z) is his payoff maximizing bid, as prescribed by (78).
Step 2: Proof for stage one
Here we consider the point of view of a bidder at stage one, given (75)-(78), and prove that it is
profitable for him to bid as specified in ~b
(1)
F in (74), if he expects the other bidders to do so. For
16In view of ~G(jr1; r1), he expects that no losing bidder has value greater than .
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each x and y in [x; x], we use ~uF (x; y) to denote the total payoff of type x from bidding ~b
(1)
F (y)
in stage one, and prove that the following inequalities hold:17
for each x 2 [r2; ), ~uF (x; x)  maxf~uF (x; ); ~uF (x; y)g, for each y 2 (; x] (83)
for each x 2 [; ], ~uF (x; )  maxf~uF (x; x); ~uF (x; y)g, for each y 2 (; x] (84)
for each x 2 (; x] and y 2 (; x], ~uF (x; x)  maxf~uF (x; x); ~uF (x; ); ~uF (x; y)g (85)
The proof of (83)-(85) is closely linked to the proof of (58)-(60). The first step consists in
using (75)-(78) to prove that
~uF (x; x) = ~uS(x; x) for each x 2 [r2; ) (86)
~uF (x; ) = ~uS(x; ) for each x 2 [r2; x] (87)
~uF (x; y) = ~uS(x; y) for each x 2 [r2; x] and each y 2 (; x] (88)
Given (58), it follows that (86)-(88) imply that (83) is satisfied. In order to prove (84)-(85), we
use (87)-(88) and then prove directly that ~uF (x; )  ~uF (x; x) for x 2 [; ], and ~uF (x; x) 
~uF (x; x) for x 2 (; x].
Step 2.1: Proof of (86). For a type x 2 [r2; ), the payoff from not bidding at stage one is
equal to ~uS(x; x) (see (40)) since
~uF (x; x) =  
n 1

x  ~b(2)F (xjno;no)

~G(xjno;no) + (n 1    n 1)

x  ~b(2)F (xjno; r1)

~G(xjno; r1)
+
Z x


x  ~b(2)F (xjno;~b(1)F (z))

~G(xjno;~b(1)F (z))dFn 1(z)
= vn(x) + (n  1)(1   )vn 1(x)
Step 2.2: Proof of (87). For a type x 2 [r2; x], the payoff from bidding r1 is
~uF (x; ) = ~p()(x  r1) + ~p`(x  ~b(2)F (xjr1; r1)) ~G(xjr1; r1)
+
Z x

(x  ~b(2)F (xjr1;~b(1)F (z))) ~G(xjr1;~b(1)F (z))dFn 1(z)
in which ~p() is the probability to win at stage one for a bidder bidding r1, and ~p` is the
probability that another bidder bidding r1 wins at stage one (see (43) and (44)). Routine
17Again, it is understood that bidding more than b
(1)
F (x) is an unprofitable option for all x, since it does not
increase the probability of winning while increasing the price to pay for the object.
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manipulations reveal that
~uF (x; ) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
~p()(x  r1) + n 12 (2     )vn 1(x) if x 2 [r2; )
~p()(x  r1) + n 12 (   )vn 1() + (n  1)(1  )vn 1(x)
+
R x

  
n M(F (s); )ds if x 2 [; ]
~p()(x  r1) + ~p`(x  n 1;r2() ~G(jr1; r1) 
R 
 s~g(sjr1; r1)ds))
+
R x
 (x  z)dFn 1(z) + (n  1)
R x
 vn 1(z)f(z)dz + (n  1)[1  F (x)]vn 1(x) if x 2 (; x]
From (47) it is immediate to see that ~uF (x; ) = ~uS(x; ), for x 2 [r2; ]. For x 2 (; x],
the equality holds since (i) ~uF (; ) = ~uS(; ) = ~p()(   r1) + ~p`
R 

~G(sjr1; r1)ds + n 12 (  
 )vn 1()+(n 1)(1 )vn 1(); (ii) ~uF1(x; ) = ~uS1(x; ) = Fn 1(x)+(n 1)Fn 2(x)[1 F (x)].
Step 2.3: Proof of (88). For a type x 2 [r2; x], the payoff ~uF (x; y) from bidding ~b(1)F (y), for
y 2 (; x], is
(x  ~b(1)F (y))Fn 1(y) +
Z x
y

x  ~b(2)F (xj~b(1)F (y);~b(1)F (z))

~G(xj~b(1)F (y);~b(1)F (z))dFn 1(z)
= (x  ~b(1)F (y))Fn 1(y)
+
8<:
R x
y (x  z)dFn 1(z) + (n  1)
R x
y vn 1(z)f(z)dz + (n  1)(1  F (x))vn 1(x) if y < x
(n  1)(1  F (y))vn 1(x) if x  y
From (48) it is immediate to see that ~uF (x; y) = ~uS(x; y).
Step 2.4: Proof of (84). Note that (87) and (88) imply that ~uF (; ) = ~uS(; ), ~uF (; ) =
~uS(; ) and limy# ~uF (x; y) = limy# ~uS(x; y) for x  . Moreover, from (87)-(88) and (59), it
follows that ~uF (x; )  ~uF (x; y) for each y 2 (; x]. Below we prove that ~uF (x; )  ~uF (x; x)
for x 2 [; ]. In fact, the payoff from not bidding at stage one for a type x 2 [; ] is
~uF (x; x) =  
n 1

x  ~b(2)F (xjno; no)

+ (n 1    n 1) max
y2[;]
(x  ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~G(yjno; r1)
+
Z x

(x  ~b(2)F (xjno;~b(1)F (z))) ~G(xjno;~b(1)F (z))dFn 1(z)
=  n 1 (x  n;r2()) + (n 1    n 1) max
y2[;]
(x  ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~G(yjno; r1)
+ (n  1)(1  )vn 1(x)
Let ~y(x) 2 argmaxy2[;](x ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~G(yjno; r1), and recall from the analysis in Step 1.2 of
the bidding function ~b
(2)
F (jno; r1) that ~y() = , hence ~uF (; x) = vn()+(n 1)(1  )vn 1() =
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~uS(; x). Moreover, in Step 1.2 we have also proved that ~y(x)  x, therefore
~uF1(x; x)   n 1 + (n 1    n 1) ~G(xjno; r1) + (n  1)(1  )Fn 2(x) = ~uS1(x; x)
hence ~uF (x; x)  ~uS(x; x)  ~uS(x; ) = ~uF (x; ) for each x 2 [; ] (the middle inequality
follows from (59)).
Step 2.5: Proof of (85). From (87)-(88) and (60) it follows that ~uF (x; x)  maxf~uF (x; ); ~uF (x; y)g
for each y 2 (; x]. Below we prove that ~uF (x; x)  ~uF (x; x).
The payoff from not bidding at stage one is
~uF (x; x) =  
n 1

x  ~b(2)F (xjno; no)

+ (n 1    n 1) max
y2[;]
(x  ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~G(yjno; r1)
+
Z x

(x  ~b(2)F (xjno;~b(1)F (z))) ~G(xjno;~b(1)F (z))dFn 1(z)
=  n 1 (x  n;r2()) + (n 1    n 1) max
y2[;]
(x  ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~G(yjno; r1)
+
Z x

(x  z)dFn 1(z) + (n  1)
Z x

vn 1(z)f(z)dz + (n  1)(1  F (x))vn 1(x)
Let ~y(x) 2 argmaxy2[;](x   ~b(2)F (yjr1; r1)) ~G(yjno; r1). From ~G(~y(x)jno; r1)  1 it follows
that ~uF1(x; x)  Fn 1(x) + (n   1)Fn 2(x)[1   F (x)], which is equal to d~uF (x;x)dx . Since
limx# ~uF (x; x) = ~uF (; +) = ~uF (; )  ~uF (; x),18 we conclude that ~uF (x; x)  ~uF (x; x)
for each x 2 (; x].
D.2 Proof of Proposition 5(ii)
The proof is largely given by the proof of Proposition 5(i), after setting  = x. Precisely,
regarding stage two, in the main text we have already taken care of (22) and (25). In order
study the case in which bw = r1, we can refer to steps 1.1-1.3 in the proof of Proposition 5(i).
Regarding stage one, we use u^F (x; y) to denote the total payoff of type x from bidding b^
(1)
F (y).
We have proved in the main text that u^S(x; x)  maxfu^S(x; ); x  r1g for each x 2 [r2; ). We
can argue as in Step 2.2 in the proof of Proposition 5(i) to conclude that (i) u^F (x; ) = u^S(x; )
for each x 2 [; x], hence u^F (x; )  x  r1; (ii) u^F (x; )  u^S(x; x).
E Addendum to Step 2.3 in the proof of Proposition 2(i): Proof
that there exists a unique r1 such that `(r1) = 0
In the proof of Proposition 2(i) Step 2.3 we have dened `(r1) from (57) asB(; x) =
n(n 1)
2 vn 1() 
M(1; )(x   r1) +
R x
 M(F (s); )ds, in which  is determined as the unique solution in (r1; x)
18The second equality follows from (16); the inequality follows from (84).
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to A(; ) = 0, given  = x, where A(; ) is from (51). Since  depends on r1, we use the
notation (r1), hence
`(r1) =
n(n  1)
2
vn 1((r1)) M(1; )(x  r1) +
Z x
(r1)
M(F (s); )ds
in which   = F ((r1)). It is enough here to prove that if r1 is such that `(r1) = 0, then
`0(r1) > 0 because this implies that no more than one r1 exists such that `(r1) = 0. Remark we
have denoted such r1 with ~r1 in Proposition 2 and elsewhere in the paper. The derivative of `
with respect to r1 is
`0(r1) =M(1; ) +
"Z x
(r1)
M2(F (s); )ds M2(1; )(x  r1)
#
f((r1))
0(r1) (89)
and if r1 satises `(r1) = 0, then
x  r1 =
n(n 1)
2 vn 1((r1)) +
R x
(r1)
M(F (s); )ds
M(1; )
Inserting this equality in (89) yields
`0(r1) =M(1; ) + f((r1))0(r1)
Z x
(r1)
M2(F (s); )ds
  f((r1))0(r1)M2(1; )
M(1; )
 
n(n  1)
2
vn 1((r1)) +
Z x
(r1)
M(F (s); )ds
!
Moreover, from A(; x) = 0 we obtain
0(r1) =
p^((r1))
Z +

n 1
2 vn 1((r1)) + ((r1)  r1)M( ;1)n

f((r1))
> 0
with p^((r1)) =
1  n
n(1  ) and Z = p^((r1))   n 1   n 12 (1   ) n 2 > 0, hence
`0(r1) =
Z x
(r1)

M2(F (s); )  M2(1; )
M(1; )
M(F (s); )

dsf((r1))
0(r1)
+
0@M(1; )  M2(1; )
M(1; )
n(n 1)
2 vn 1((r1))f((r1))p^((r1))
Z +

n 1
2 vn 1((r1)) + ((r1)  r1)M( ;1)n

f((r1))
1A
The rest of the proof consists in showing that both the terms in `0(r1) are positive.
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E.1 Proof that the rst term in `0(r1) is positive
Here we prove that
R x
(r1)

M2(F (s); )  M2(1; )M(1; ) M(F (s); )

dsf((r1))
0(r1) > 0 by showing
that M2(F (s); )   M2(1; )M(1; ) M(F (s); ) > 0 for each s 2 ((r1); x]. For the sake of brevity, we
write b instead of   and a instead of F (s) and prove that M2(a; b)  M2(1;b)M(1;b) M(a; b)  0 for each
a; b such that 0 < b < a < 1. We nd that
M2(a; b)  M2(1; b)
M(1; b)
M(a; b) =
Cb(a)
b (1  b) (a  b)3 (bn   bn+ n  1)
in which Cb is a function of a, given a xed b in (0; 1):
Cb(a) =
 
2bn   n (n  1) b2 + 2n (n  2) b  (n  1) (n  2) bn+1
+
 
(n2 + n)b2   2bn+1   2(n2   1)b+ n2   n bna
+n
 
(n  1)bn+1   (n+ 1)bn + (n+ 1)b  (n  1) b2an 1
+
 
2(n2   1)bn   2(n2   2n)bn+1   (n2 + n)b2 + (n  1)(n  2) ban
+(n  1)  (n  2)bn   nbn 1 + nb  n+ 2 ban+1
Hence, the sign of M2(a; b)  M2(1;b)M(1;b) M(a; b) is equal to the sign of Cb(a) and now we show that
Cb(a) > 0 for each b 2 (0; 1), a 2 (b; 1). First notice that Cb(b) = 0, Cb(1) = 0, and then we
prove that there exists an a in the interval (b; 1) such that C 0b(a) > 0 for a 2 (b; a), and C 0b(a) < 0
for a 2 (a; 1). This implies that Cb(a) > 0 for each a 2 (b; 1). Precisely,
C 0b(a) =
 
(n2 + n)b2   2bn+1   2(n2   1)b+ n2   n bn
+(n2   n)  (n  1)bn+1   (n+ 1)bn + (n+ 1)b  (n  1) b2an 2
+n
 
2(n2   1)bn   2(n2   2n)bn+1   (n2 + n)b2 + (n  1)(n  2) ban 1
+(n2   1)  (n  2)bn   nbn 1 + nb  n+ 2 ban
and C 0b(b) = 0. Moreover,
C 00b (a) = n(n  1)an 3C^b(a)
with
C^b(a) = (n  2)
 
(n  1)bn+1   (n+ 1)bn + (n+ 1)b  (n  1) b2
+
 
2(n2   1)bn   2(n2   2n)bn+1   (n2 + n)b2 + (n  1)(n  2) ba
+(n+ 1)
 
(n  2)bn   nbn 1 + nb  n+ 2 ba2
Notice that C^b is a second degree concave polynomial in a, and a1 = b is a solution for
the equation C^b(a) = 0 since C^b(b) = 0. Moreover, there exists another solution a2 such that
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b < a2 < 1, given that C^
0
b(b) > 0 and C^b(1) < 0 (precisely, a2 =
n 1
n+1
 b+bn n 1
n+1
bn+1
1  n
n 2 b+
n
n 2 b
n 1 bn ).
19 This
implies C 00b (a) > 0 for a 2 (b; a2), C 00b (a) < 0 for a 2 (a2; 1). Therefore C 0b is strictly increasing
for a 2 (b; a2), is strictly decreasing for a 2 (a2; 1). Since C 0b(b) = 0, if follows that C 0b(a) > 0 if
a 2 (b; a), for some a between a2 and 1, and C 0b(a) < 0 if a 2 (a; 1).20
E.2 Proof that the second term in `0(r1) is positive
The second term in `0(r1) is equal to
M2(1; )

Z + ((r1)  r1)M( ;1)n f((r1))

+
 
M2(1; )  nM2(1; )p^((r1))

n 1
2 vn 1((r1))f((r1))
M(1; )

Z +

n 1
2 vn 1((r1)) + ((r1)  r1)M( ;1)n

f((r1))

It is immediate that the denominator and M2(1; )

Z + ((r1)  r1)M( ;1)n f((r1))

are both
positive. We here prove that M2(1; )  nM2(1; )p^((r1)) > 0, but we use x rather than   for
the sake of brevity. We obtain that M2(1; x)  nM2(1; x)p^ = q(x)(1 x)4 , with
q(x) = n2   3n+3  n(2n  3)x+ n2x2   nxn 1 +2(2n  3)xn   3nxn+1 + nx2n 1   (n  3)x2n
In the following of the proof we show that q(x) > 0 for each x 2 (0; 1).
Step 1: The proof for n = 3; 4; 5
Here we write down q(x) for n = 3; 4; 5, and it is immediate that q(x) > 0 for each x 2 (0; 1).
For n = 3, q(x) = (3 + 3x) (1  x)4. For n = 4, q(x) =  7 + 8x+ 6x2   x4 (1  x)4. For n = 5,
q(x) =
 
13 + 17x+ 15x2 + 10x3   3x5   2x6 (1  x)4.
Step 2: The proof for n  6
We prove below that q00(x) > 0 for each x 2 (0; 1). Therefore q0 is strictly increasing in [0; 1],
and since q0(1) = 0, it follows that q0(x) < 0 for each x 2 (0; 1). Hence, q is strictly decreasing
19The inequality C^0b(b) > 0 is equivalent to t(b) > 0, with t(b) = (n   2)(n   1)   2 (n+ 1) (n  2) b + n(n +
1)b2   2 (n+ 1) bn + 2 (n  2) bn+1. We nd that t000(b) < 0 for each b 2 (0; 1), hence t00 is strictly decreasing.
Since t00(1) = 0, it follows that t00(b) > 0 for each b 2 (0; 1), hence t0 is strictly increasing. Since t0(1) = 0, it
follows that t0(b) < 0 for each b 2 (0; 1), hence t is strictly decreasing. Since t(1) = 0, it follows that t(b) > 0 for
each b 2 (0; 1).
The inequality C^b(1) < 0 is equivalent to t(b) > 0, with t(b) = 2n   4   2 (n+ 1) b + (n + 1)nbn 1  
2 (n+ 1) (n  2) bn + (n   1)(n   2)bn+1. We nd that t00(b) > 0 for each b 2 (0; 1) , hence t0 is strictly in-
creasing. Since t0(1) = 0, it follows that t0(b) < 0 for each b 2 (0; 1), hence t is strictly decreasing. Since t(1) = 0,
it follows that t(b) > 0 for each b 2 (0; 1).
20It is impossible that C0b(a) > 0 for each a 2 (b; 1) since Cb(b) = Cb(1).
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in [0; 1], and since q(1) = 0, it follows that q(x) > 0 for each x 2 (0; 1). In detail, we nd
q0(x) =  n(2n  3) + 2n2x  n(n  1)xn 2 + 2(2n  3)nxn 1   3n(n+ 1)xn + n(2n  1)x2n 2
 2n(n  3)x2n 1
q00(x) = 2n2   n(n  1)(n  2)xn 3 + 2(2n  3)n(n  1)xn 2   3n2(n+ 1)xn 1
+n(2n  1)(2n  2)x2n 3   2n(n  3)(2n  1)x2n 2
Step 2.1: For each n  6, q00(x) > 0 for each x 2 (0; 1
2
]. For each m  6 we have
that 2m  m2, that is  (12)m    1m2 . Hence, for each x 2 (0; 12 ] the following inequalities
hold:  n(n  1)(n  2)xn 3   n(n  1)(n  2) 1
(n 3)2 ,  3n2(n+ 1)xn 1   3n2(n+ 1) 1(n 1)2 ,
 2n(n  3)(2n  1)x2n 2   2n(n  3)(2n  1) 1
4(n 1)2 . They imply
q00(x) > 2n2   n(n  1)(n  2)
(n  3)2  
3n2(n+ 1)
(n  1)2  
2n(n  3)(2n  1)
4(n  1)2
=
n
2 (n2   4n+ 3)2
 
(4n3   2n2 + 27n+ 125)(n  5)2 + 652(n  5) + 104
for each x 2 (0; 12 ], which is positive for each n  6.
Step 2.2: For each n  6, q00(x) > 0 for each x 2 (1
2
; x1], with x1 =
2n2 5n+3+r
3n2+3n
and
r =
p
n4   8n3 + 46n2   36n+ 9. We write q00(x) as follows:
q00(x) = 2n(2n  1) (n  1  (n  3)x)x2n 3
+2n2 +
  n(n  1)(n  2) + 2n(2n  3)(n  1)x  3n2(n+ 1)x2xn 3
Then notice that 2n(2n  1) (n  1  (n  3)x)x2n 3 > 0 for each x 2 (12 ; 1), and
2n2 +
  n(n  1)(n  2) + 2n(2n  3)(n  1)x  3n2(n+ 1)x2xn 3
> 2n2xn 3 +
  n(n  1)(n  2) + 2n(2n  3)(n  1)x  3n2(n+ 1)x2xn 3
= n
 
5n  n2   2 + 2(2n  3)(n  1)x  3n(n+ 1)x2xn 3
is non-negative for x between 12 and x1.
Step 2.3: For each n  6, q00(x) > 0 for each x 2 (x1; 1). Here we use the third deriva-
tive of q:
q000(x) =  n(n  1)(n  2)(n  3)xn 4 + 2(2n  3)n(n  1)(n  2)xn 3   3n2(n+ 1)(n  1)xn 2
+n(2n  1)(2n  2)(2n  3)x2n 4   2n(n  3)(2n  1)(2n  2)x2n 3
= n(n  1)xn 4h(x)
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with
h(x) =  (n 2)(n 3)+2(2n 3)(n 2)x 3n(n+1)x2+2(2n 1)(2n 3)xn 4(n 3)(2n 1)xn+1
and
h0(x) = 2(2n  3)(n  2)  6n(n+ 1)x+ 2(2n  1)(2n  3)nxn 1   4(n  3)(2n  1)(n+ 1)xn
h00(x) =  6n(n+ 1) + 2(2n  1)(2n  3)n(n  1)xn 2   4(n  3)(2n  1)(n+ 1)nxn 1
h000(x) = (n  1)(2n  1) (2n(2n  3)(n  2)  4(n  3)(n+ 1)nx)xn 3
Step 2.3.1: For each n  6, we have that 1  4n 6
n2+n
< x1 < 1  4n 23=3n2+n . These
inequalities follow from simple manipulations.
Step 2.3.2: There exists x2 2 (x1; 1) such that h00 is strictly increasing in (x1; x2),
h00 is strictly decreasing in (x2; 1). It is immediate that h000(x) > 0 for x 2 (x1; x2), and
h000(x) < 0 for x 2 (x2; 1), with x2 = (2n 3)(n 2)(2n+2)(n 3) . Then, x2  

1  4n 23=3
n2+n

= (15n 41)
2+389
90n(n+1)(n 3) > 0
implies x2 > x1.
Step 2.3.3: h00(x1) > 0, h00(1) =  4n(n2   8n+ 6). From the proof of Step 2.3.2 we
know that h00 is strictly increasing in the interval (0; x2), hence h00(1   4n 6n2+n) < h00(x1) (from
Step 2.3.1) and now we prove that h00(1  4n 6
n2+n
) > 0. Precisely,
h00(1  4n  6
n2 + n
) =
2 (2n  1) (n2 + n)2(7n2   27n+ 36)
(n2   3n+ 6)2


1  4n  6
n2 + n
n
  3(n
2   3n+ 6)2
(n2 + n) (2n  1) (7n2   27n+ 36)

and h00(6) = 14 940343 > 0, h
00(7) = 307 852 4834302 592 > 0, h
00(8) = 10 409 940 76790 699 264 > 0, h
00(9) = 42 860243 > 0. For
n  10, we notice that (1  4n 6
n2+n
)n is a decreasing sequence such that (1  4n 6
n2+n
)n > e 4 > 9500
and 9500   3(n
2 3n+6)2
(n2+n)(2n 1)(7n2 27n+36) =
3(2894n+199n2+42n3+27 669)(n 10)2+845616(n 10)+101 460
500n(2n 1)(n+1)(7n2 27n+36) > 0.
Step 2.3.4: h0(x1) < 0, h0(1) = 2n2 + 2n > 0. From Steps 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 we know
that h00(x) > 0 for x 2 (x1; x2), hence h0 is strictly increasing in the interval [x1; x2] and
h0(x1) < h0(1  4n 23=3n2+n ) (from Step 2.3.1). Now we prove that h0(1  4n 23=3n2+n ) < 0:
h0(1  4n  23=3
n2 + n
) =  2(2n
2 + n  1)  27n2   100n+ 138
3n2   9n+ 23


(3n2   9n+ 23)(n2   2n+ 17)
(2n2 + n  1)(27n2   100n+ 138)  

1  4n  23=3
n2 + n
n
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is negative as (i) (3n
2 9n+23)(n2 2n+17)
(2n2+n 1)(27n2 100n+138) >
21
400 for each n  6, since (3n
2 9n+23)(n2 2n+17)
(2n2+n 1)(27n2 100n+138)  
21
400 =
66(n  701
44
)2(n 2)2+ 725 357
88
(n 2)2+23 794n+59 318
400(2n 1)(n+1)(27n2 100n+138) > 0 ; (ii)

1  4n 23=3
n2+n
n
is a decreasing se-
quence such that 21400 >

1  46 23=3
62+6
6  1  4n 23=3
n2+n
n
for each n  6 .
Step 2.3.5: h(x1) < 0, h(1) = 0. From the proof of Step 2.3.3 we know that h
00(x) > 0
for x 2 [1  4n 6
n2+n
; x1], hence h
0(x) < h0(x1) < 0 for x 2 [1  4n 6n2+n ; x1] and h is strictly decreasing
in [1  4n 6
n2+n
; x1], thus h(1  4n 6n2+n) > h(x1). Now we prove that h(1  4n 6n2+n) < 0:
h(1 4n  6
n2 + n
) =  2 (2n  1) (11n
2   33n+ 36)
n (n+ 1)

(n+ 1) (2n2   9n+ 18)
(2n  1) (11n2   33n+ 36)  

1  4n  6
n2 + n
n
is negative as (i) (n+1)(2n
2 9n+18)
(2n 1)(11n2 33n+36)   112 = (n+4)((4n 15)
2+279)
96(2n 1)(11n2 33n+36) > 0; (ii)

1  4n 6
n2+n
n
is a
decreasing sequence such that 112 >

1  46 6
62+6
6  1  4n 6
n2+n
n
for each n  6.
Step 2.3.6: There exists x3 between x1 and 1 such that h
0(x) < 0 for x 2 (x1; x3),
h0(x) > 0 for x 2 (x3; 1). For n = 6; 7 we have h00(1) > 0. From steps 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 it
follows that h00(x) > 0 for each x 2 (x1; 1), hence h0 is strictly increasing. Then the conclusion
follows from Step 2.3.4.
For n  8 we have h00(1) < 0. From steps 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 it follows that there exists x4
between x2 and 1 such that h
00(x) > 0 for each x 2 (x1; x4), h00(x) < 0 for each x 2 (x4; 1).
Hence h0 is strictly increasing in (x1; x4), strictly decreasing in (x4; 1) and the conclusion follows
from Step 2.3.4.
Step 2.3.7: q00(x) > 0 for each x 2 (x1; 1). From Steps 2.3.5 and 2.3.6 it follows that
h(x) < 0 for each x 2 (x1; 1), hence q000(x) < 0 for each x 2 (x1; 1). Then q00(1) = 0 implies that
q00(x) > 0 for each x 2 (x1; 1).
57
